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THE FEDERALISM CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING MEDICAL 
PRIVACY IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
ANI B. SATZ 
 Under current law, injured workers face a Hobson’s choice: They may file for 
workers’ compensation or maintain their medical privacy. The reason for this is that 
§ 164.512(l) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy 
Rule (HPR) is widely misinterpreted by courts and legislatures as a wholesale waiver 
of privacy protections for injured workers. Section 164.512(l) excludes workers’ 
compensation from federal privacy protections that may frustrate the efficient 
administration of workers’ compensation claims. As the history and intent behind the 
HPR indicate, § 164.512(l) is premised on the assumption that states will protect 
workers’ privacy by creating and implementing their own privacy regimes. An 
original empirical survey detailed in this Article indicates states have not adequately 
provided such protections.  
This Article argues that workers’ compensation programs must be aligned with 
the federal privacy protections of the HPR and proposes actions for the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services and the states to remedy privacy failures. 
The Article begins by explaining the misunderstood relationship between the HPR 
and workers’ compensation generally. It then discusses why § 164.512(l) is 
misconstrued. The Article suggests that the answer may be rooted in the unclear 
boundary between constitutionally grounded federal privacy protections and the 
historic role of states in administering their own workers’ compensation programs 
and protecting privacy. The Article argues that the protection of privacy in workers’ 
compensation highlights a unique federalism relationship—what this Article terms 
“symbiotic” federalism—whereby the federal and state governments are mutually 
dependent on one another to ensure privacy is protected. Under this reading, 
workers’ compensation statutes must be interpreted “through,” or in the spirit of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
While on a break at Arby’s, Laura McRae accidentally consumed lye that had 
been left in the break room in a drinking cup like her own.1 She suffered third-degree 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. McRae v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 721 S.E.2d 602, 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 
734 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. 2012). 
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burns to her esophagus and sixty-five percent permanent disability to her entire 
body.2 As a result, McRae filed for workers’ compensation.3  
Prior to the workers’ compensation board’s hearing about McRae’s disability, 
Arby’s attorneys attempted to meet alone with her personal treating physician, with 
no limits on the scope of protected health information (PHI) to be disclosed.4 The 
physician declined, absent express permission from McRae.5 Responding to a motion 
from defense counsel, the administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered McRae to 
authorize the ex parte communication.6 The ALJ also denied McRae’s request for 
immediate review of that decision because “McRae could informally contact the 
treating physician herself and ‘inquire about any communications made between [the 
physician] and the Employer/Insurer.’”7 McRae refused to sign the release, and her 
hearing was removed from the calendar.8 She appealed the decision, and the appellate 
division of the workers’ compensation board and subsequently the Superior Court in 
her county affirmed the ALJ’s decision.9 While the Court of Appeals of Georgia 
reversed the Superior Court,10 the Georgia Supreme Court overturned that decision,11 
and the ex parte conversation was allowed.12  
The outcome would have been very different had this been a medical malpractice 
or other tort case for bodily harm, rather than a workers’ compensation case. In fact, 
less than a year before McRae’s case was decided, the Georgia Supreme Court 
recognized in the medical malpractice case Baker v. Wellstar Health System13 that 
“the dangers associated with ex parte interviews of health care providers are 
numerous,” including probing that is prejudicial, disclosing information not 
documented in the medical record, and influencing health care providers’ 
testimony.14 The Baker court held that if such ex parte communications occur, 
significant protections must be in place.15 Pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule (HPR), a plaintiff must be 
provided notice with an opportunity to refuse the disclosure, or the defendant must 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.   
 11. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Ga. 2012), rev’g 721 S.E.2d 602 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  
 12. McRae v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 742 S.E.2d 510, 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).  
 13. 703 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. 2010). 
 14. Id. at 604 (finding that “dangers . . . includ[e] (1) the potential for unwarranted probing 
into matters irrelevant to the litigation yet highly sensitive and possibly prejudicial to the 
patient-plaintiff; (2) the potential for disclosure of information, such as mental impressions 
not documented in the medical record, that the health care provider has never actually 
communicated to the patient-plaintiff; and (3) the potential for defense counsel to influence 
the health care provider’s testimony, unwittingly or otherwise, by encouraging solidarity with 
or arousing sympathy for a defendant health care provider”). 
 15. See id. at 605 (detailing the requirements for ex parte communications). 
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obtain a protective order to limit the scope of PHI disclosed.16 Further, to comply 
with “the spirit of HIPAA’s privacy protections” and state constitutional privacy 
protections, the court held that a protective order must be “fashion[ed] . . . carefully 
and with specificity as to scope” as well as entail voluntary physician participation.17 
Additionally, the court found that if there is “any evidence indicating that ex parte 
interviews have [sic] or are expected to stray beyond their proper bounds,” courts 
may require that the plaintiff or her representative be permitted to attend the 
interview or to receive a transcript.18 
The differential treatment of PHI in workers’ compensation compared to almost 
all other contexts—including other tort and workplace actions—is striking.19 This is 
especially so because workers’ compensation proceedings should not require more 
PHI disclosure than litigation. While the HPR provides rules for notice and scope of 
PHI disclosure with respect to medical malpractice and other litigation (and even for 
inmates),20 no federal rules in the HPR or elsewhere govern such practices in 
workers’ compensation.21 Discovery and evidence rules, which serve to safeguard 
unwarranted disclosure of PHI in litigation, often do not apply to workers’ 
compensation proceedings.22 Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for 
example, requires a showing of need for disclosure.23 Most states have adopted a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See id. at 603 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2018)). 
 17. Baker, 703 S.E.2d at 605 (“[T]rial courts should state with particularity: (1) the 
name(s) of the health care provider(s) who may be interviewed; (2) the medical condition(s) 
at issue in the litigation regarding which the health care provider(s) may be interviewed; (3) 
the fact that the interview is at the request of the defendant, not the patient-plaintiff, and is for 
the purpose of assisting defense counsel in the litigation; and (4) the fact that the health care 
provider’s participation in the interview is voluntary.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 608 (D. Nev. 2016) 
(finding in a transgender discrimination and negligent retention action that: “[T]he court will 
not compel Roberts to disclose and produce all of his medical records from 2009 to the present 
[i.e., records pertaining to his gender transition] on the speculation they may contain references 
to his mental state or [alleged] emotional distress.”); Bailey v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 
286 F.R.D. 625, 630 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (limiting PHI disclosure in Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) interference and retaliation case to that prior to FMLA leave). 
 20. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(5). While the HPR applies to inmates, they do not enjoy 
the same notice requirements. Id. § 164.520(a)(3). 
 21. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (placing limits on the amount of PHI disclosed in 
judicial and administrative proceedings), and id. § 164.512(k)(5) (establishing limits on PHI 
disclosures for inmates), with id. § 164.512(l) (authorizing PHI disclosure in workers’ 
compensation proceedings “to the extent necessary to comply with” state laws). 
 22. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 35 (providing standards in civil litigation for disclosures and 
for requiring physical and mental examinations and reports from such examinations). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(2)(A); see, e.g., Smith v. J.I. Case Corp., 163 F.R.D. 229, 230 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (“Under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 35, the court may order a party to submit to a mental 
examination only if that party’s mental condition is ‘in controversy,’ and the movant has 
shown ‘good cause’ for the person to be examined. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court noted that [these] requirements ‘are not met by mere conclusory allegations of the 
pleadings—nor by mere relevance to the case—but require an affirmative showing by the 
movant that each condition as to which an examination is sought is really and genuinely in 
controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular examination.’ . . . 
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much looser statutory standard in workers’ compensation proceedings to allow PHI 
disclosure “related to” the claim.24 And as McRae and Baker indicate, disclosure of 
PHI through ex parte communications with treating physicians may be broad and 
without notice in workers’ compensation, while similar disclosures in medical 
malpractice, employment discrimination, and other litigation are narrowly cabined. 
Further, unlike written medical records obtained during tort and employment 
litigation, the scope of PHI released through the workers’ compensation system is 
broad. Entire workers’ compensation records are public in some states.25 Even if an 
injured worker does not file a workers’ compensation claim, details of her injury 
must be reported to the workers’ compensation board in most states.26 For individuals 
who file a claim, their medical history may be made available to employers, insurers, 
and state administrators.27 Once PHI enters the public realm, its uses are endless. 
Broad PHI disclosure during workers’ compensation proceedings may result in 
workers being denied compensation for serious injury and disability. Such PHI 
disclosures may entail either release of written medical records or ex parte 
communications between an employer or its agent and a treating physician. When 
disclosure of medical records is not limited in scope, unrelated and possibly 
prejudicial medical history may be used against workers. Once more aspects of an 
employee’s health status are viewed as relevant, employees may be subject to 
independent medical examinations and tests not directly related to their claim. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
[A]lthough no ‘hard and fast rule’ has been articulated, courts seem to allow them when 1) 
there is a separate tort claim for emotional distress, 2) the plaintiff alleges that he suffers from 
a severe ongoing mental injury or a psychiatric disorder, 3) the plaintiff will offer expert 
testimony to support the claim, or 4) the plaintiff concedes his mental condition is in 
controversy. Thus, a claim of emotional distress, without more, is insufficient to put the 
plaintiff’s mental condition ‘in controversy.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 120 (1964))). 
 24. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-207(a) (2017) (“[A]ny physician who has examined, 
treated, or tested the employee or consulted about the employee shall provide . . . all 
information and records related to the examination, treatment, testing, or consultation 
concerning the employee.” (emphasis added)).  
 25. James G. Hodge, Jr., The Intersection of Federal Health Information Privacy and 
State Administrative Law: The Protection of Individual Health Data and Workers’ 
Compensation, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 117, 126 (1999) (“[M]any workers’ compensation claims 
require litigation before an administrative tribunal. These proceedings are open to the public 
and involve legal examinations of the injured employee, her treating physicians, and the 
employer’s independent medical examiner concerning the medical treatment and history of 
the employee. Workers’ compensation files, including sensitive medical reports, may be a 
matter of public record in such cases.”). Additionally, private companies collect data about 
terminated employees that may be used by future employers. Id. at 120; see, e.g., Pre-
Employment Screening for Small to Mid-Sized Employers, PFC INFO. SERV., 
https://pfcinformation.com/employers/#services [https://perma.cc/8LPY-Y6UJ] (offering 
workers’ compensation screening services). 
 26. Hodge, supra note 25, at 124. 
 27. Id. at 125–26. 
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results of these examinations may allow employers to argue another cause of, or 
precondition to, the injury at stake.28  
When ex parte communications are allowed, they may be without notice and 
outside the presence of plaintiff or her counsel.29 These communications may be used 
to pressure physicians to characterize workers’ injuries as less severe than originally 
diagnosed or as unrelated to workplace incidents.30 This is significant because in 
workers’ compensation, diagnosis determines which benefits are compensable.  
The differences between how PHI is handled in workers’ compensation versus 
other tort and employment actions may seem counterintuitive. One might think 
injured workers would be offered greater protections for their PHI for a couple of 
reasons. First, consent to disclose medical records may not be truly voluntary. In the 
United States, workers’ compensation is often the exclusive remedy for work-related 
injuries, and injured workers may not have the option of litigating their claims.31 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. In one case, a woman who had part of her hand amputated at work was pressured by 
her employer’s insurer to disclose oncology records pertaining to her breast cancer. 
Employer/Insurer’s Motion Seeking an Order Compelling Claimant to Withdraw Objection as 
to the Request for Production of Documents on Anwan Medical Center-Oncology Division 
(June 5, 2013) (on file with author) (redacted); Response to Employee/Claimant’s Objection 
to Employer/Insurer’s Motion Seeking an Order Compelling Claimant to Withdraw Objection 
as to the Request for Production of Documents on AnMed [sic] Medical Center-Oncology 
Division (June 20, 2013) (on file with author) (redacted). The breast cancer was unrelated to 
her hand amputation. The employer’s insurer argued that when the employee mentioned her 
breast cancer in a counseling session aimed at assisting her cope with her amputation, the 
employee “made her issue of cancer relevant to the compensable rehabilitation of her 
psychological state.” Employer/Insurer’s Motion Seeking an Order Compelling Claimant to 
Withdraw Objection as to the Request for Production of Documents on Anwan Medical 
Center-Oncology Division, supra. Presumably, the need for counseling for the amputation (the 
only injury for which she was receiving workers’ compensation) could be determined by the 
records already obtained from the treating psychotherapist. One can only speculate about why 
oncology records were requested, but they are outside the scope of what is necessary. One 
hypothesis is that if the cancer is terminal, the insurer might avoid settling the claim. E-mail 
from Jennifer A. Jarvis, Att’y, Sartain Law Offices, to author (May 3, 2017; 3:43 PM) (on file 
with author). 
 29. See, e.g, Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 652–53 (W. Va. 1994) 
(discussing ex parte communications when no statute specifically authorizes them). 
 30. In one situation, a worker with a back injury was caught on his employer’s video 
surveillance allegedly helping a friend carry trash from a construction site on the injured 
worker’s day off. E-mail from Jennifer A. Jarvis, Att’y, Sartain Law Offices, to author (Mar. 
28, 2017, 4:26 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Jennifer A. Jarvis, supra note 28. The 
video, taken through dense trees, barely shows two human images, both the same height, in 
white shirts and hats, and with facial hair. Id. One person is picking up small items, possibly 
cardboard. E-mail from Jennifer A. Jarvis, supra; E-mail from Jennifer Jarvis, supra note 28. 
In an ex parte meeting without notice, the employer’s attorney showed the video to the 
authorized treating physician, i.e., the physician responsible for the patient’s diagnosis and 
treatment. E-mail from Jennifer A. Jarvis, supra. Based on the video, the physician shifted the 
worker from light to full duty and discontinued treatment. Report of Authorized Treating 
Physician (Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with author) (redacted) (“I have put him back to full duty 
because of his ability seen on a recent video surveillance.”). 
 31. Hodge, supra note 25, at 124–25. 
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Relatedly, work absences may not be tolerated outside a filed claim,32 and health 
insurers may refuse to pay medical costs that would be covered by workers’ 
compensation.33 Second, employers often choose the plaintiff’s authorized treating 
physician, so the balance of power is already shifted towards employers in this 
regard.34  
Why must injured workers choose between compensation and medical privacy?35 
The HPR contains a widely misunderstood provision, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l), which 
states in part, “[a] covered entity may disclose protected health information as 
authorized by and to the extent necessary to comply with laws relating to workers’ 
compensation.”36 State legislatures and courts universally view § 164.512(l) as a 
privacy waiver.37 As a result, courts do not apply federal privacy protections to 
workers’ compensation proceedings, and states fail to craft workers’ compensation 
statutes to protect privacy meaningfully.38 Injured workers are required to consent to 
disclosure or to forego compensation, and scope of disclosure is often insufficiently 
limited.39 
The question remains why § 164.512(l) is interpreted as a federal privacy waiver 
when state gaps in protecting workers’ privacy persist. To be sure, state courts and 
legislatures may falsely believe states are adequately protecting workers’ privacy. 
But the answer is more likely rooted in concerns about federalism. Historically, broad 
latitude was given to states to administer their own workers’ compensation programs 
and to protect privacy.40 The HPR could frustrate the administration of workers’ 
compensation claims by imposing additional requirements on employers and slowing 
the adjudication process. Workers also could pressure their physicians to limit or not 
to disclose relevant medical information.  
This Article is the first to address the challenges of federalism in protecting 
medical privacy in workers’ compensation after the promulgation of the HPR and to 
propose legal change.41 The Article argues that workers’ compensation programs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 125. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-9-201(b)–(c), (d)–(f) (2017) (discussing the 
employer’s choice of physician absent an emergency or the employer’s failure to follow 
specified procedures for physician selection). 
 35. I use “privacy” loosely in this Article as Congress uses it in the HPR to mean both 
“privacy” (protection from disclosures one does not want to make to anyone) and 
“confidentiality” (protection from disclosures one does not want to make to certain people). 
See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 529–30 (Or. 1985) (discussing 
the distinction between “privacy” and “confidentiality”). 
 36. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) (2018). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. See infra Section III.A. 
 40. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,462, 82,463–64 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164); Brevard 
Crihfield, Foreword to COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND 
REHABILITATION LAW (REVISED) (1974); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE 
SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 49, 55, 58, 61, 80–87, 90–91, 224, 315 
(1999). 
 41. For an excellent pre-HPR article on this topic, see Hodge, supra note 25. 
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must align with the federal privacy protections of the HPR and proposes actions for 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and states to remedy 
departures. Part I discusses the complex relationship between the HPR and workers’ 
compensation. This relationship is often misunderstood by legislatures and courts, 
compounding the challenges of federalism in this area. Specifically, Part I addresses 
the HPR’s § 164.512(l) exception, permitted and authorized disclosures under the 
HPR, and the scope of such disclosures under legal and practice of medicine 
restrictions. 
Part II examines preemption challenges under the HPR and health information 
policy. The HPR’s § 164.512(l) exception and standard preemption provisions are 
discussed in the context of HHS’s intent to facilitate administrative proceedings, seek 
a balanced exchange of information between employees and employers, and prevent 
fraud. Current judicial interpretation of § 164.512(l) stands in stark contrast to these 
intentions. Courts assume § 164.512(l) is a blanket exclusion from federal privacy 
protections, rather than an exception that must be read “through,” or interpreted in 
the spirit of, the HPR. While the HPR allows states to develop privacy protections 
consistent with the Rule, states fail to fill in the legislative gaps given the limited 
reach of state constitutional provisions, the routine waiver of statutory privacy 
protections in the context of workers’ compensation, and the ineffective statutory 
limitations on scope of PHI disclosure.  
Part III provides the first published survey of states’ response to protecting 
workers’ privacy. It examines four areas: scope of PHI disclosure in workers’ 
compensation proceedings, legality of ex parte communications between parties and 
treating or examining physicians, requirements for notice of such communications, 
and requirements for protective orders governing disclosure of PHI.  
Part IV argues that the gap in legal protection created by § 164.512(l) highlights 
a federalism relationship best understood as “symbiotic federalism,” whereby 
different levels of government are mutually dependent. While the HPR exclusion 
recognizes states’ historic role in administering workers’ compensation programs 
and assumes that they are in the best position to establish privacy protections to 
administer claims efficiently, the HPR also serves as a floor for privacy protection. 
Thus, this Part argues § 164.512(l) affords states opportunities for developing 
privacy protection but does not authorize legal departures that violate the spirit of the 
HPR. As a result, HHS must clarify the meaning of § 164.512(l) and encourage states 
to comply with it. Compliance requires states to create law that imposes meaningful 
restrictions on PHI disclosures in workers’ compensation proceedings, narrowly 
tailoring them to what is necessary to administrate claims. If states fail to comply, 
conflicting state workers’ compensation statutes must be preempted. Additionally, if 
HHS authorizes ex parte communications, the agency could require notice and 
protective orders for PHI disclosures.  
I. HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
A. Overview of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) in 1996, largely to ensure portability of health insurance for individuals 
2019] PROTECTING MEDICAL PRIVACY  1563 
 
moving between employer-based group health plans.42 Additionally, HIPAA 
recognizes the increased use of medical information in health care delivery as well 
as the need to manage and to protect such information.43 While the statute does not 
protect medical privacy itself, it authorized HHS, the agency tasked with enforcing 
HIPAA, to promulgate privacy regulations three years from the effective date if 
Congress failed to act.44  
Congress did not act, and HHS issued regulations in 200045 (modified in 2002)46 
often referred to as the “HIPAA Privacy Rule” (HPR), which took effect in 2003.47 
The HPR is an extensive privacy regulation that addresses a number of concerns, 
including: inappropriate disclosures and resulting stigma and discrimination, the 
increasing electronic transmission of data, the growing number of health care 
professionals with access to health information, and the need for privacy to 
encourage patients to seek medical care.48 HHS’s language is strong: “Privacy is a 
fundamental right. . . . [I]t must be viewed differently than any ordinary economic 
good. . . . [I]t speaks to our individual and collective freedom.”49 As a result, the HPR 
restricts the use of “protected health information” (PHI), or information that may be 
used to link a patient with her medical records.50 While HIPAA does not afford a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
HIPAA simplifies health insurance administration, provides coverage for individuals with pre-
existing conditions, addresses waste as well as fraud and abuse in health insurance and the 
provision of health care, improves access to long-term care, and provides tax incentives for 
medical savings accounts. Id.  
 43. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,466 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
 44. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (2012) (Recommendations with Respect to Privacy of Certain 
Health Information)). 
 45. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,462. 
 46. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,181 (Aug. 12, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
 47. Id. Large health plans were given until April 14, 2003, to comply and small health 
plans until April 14, 2004. Id. at 53,250. The HPR was subsequently amended in 2009 and 
2013. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach 
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164); 
Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,740 (Aug. 
24, 2009) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
 48. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 82,463–68 (describing the purposes of the HPR). 
 49. Id. at 82,464. Congress later provided even stronger federal protections than the HPR 
for genetic information, and some states afford heightened protection for genetic and HIV 
status. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.); see, e.g., 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780–2787 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2019) (genetic information); 
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
7601–7612 (West 2012). 
 50. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2018) (“A covered entity or business associate may not 
use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or 
1564 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1555 
 
private right of action, a number of courts apply the federal standard of care in private 
litigation.51 
One of the ways the HPR protects patients’ privacy is by requiring physicians 
who maintain electronic health or billing records to guard against improper PHI 
disclosure.52 The goal of this privacy protection is to shield patients from harmful 
disclosures and thereby encourage them to seek needed medical care.53 Notably, 
some courts even apply the federal privacy standard in medical malpractice when a 
litigant waives her right to privacy for litigation purposes.54 Exceptions to federal 
protections exist only when information is de-identified, such as for research 
purposes or for disclosures made in accordance with a compelling state interest, as 
in the case of law enforcement.55 
The HPR defines “PHI” and “covered entities” and outlines disclosures that are 
“required,” “permitted,” or “authorized.”56 PHI is “individually identifiable health 
information.”57 This is information, including diagnoses and demographic 
information, that: 
[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or 
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; 
or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to 
                                                                                                                 
 
by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter.”); id. § 164.302 (“A covered entity . . . must 
comply with the applicable standards . . . of this subpart with respect to electronic protected 
health information of a covered entity.”). 
 51. See, e.g., I.S. v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:11CV235SNLJ, 2011 WL 2433585 (E.D. Mo. 
June 14, 2011) (upholding a negligence per se claim under the HPR standard); Byrne v. Avery 
Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, 102 A.3d 32 (Conn. 2014) (using the HPR to establish 
directly the standard of care in a state negligence action); Northlake Med. Ctr. v. Queen, 634 
S.E.2d 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (striking down a Georgia statute with a private right of action 
that does not meet the HPR standard); Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2006) (using the HPR to inform the standard of care in a negligence action); Sorensen v. 
Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295, 299 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (noting the plaintiff’s argument that the 
HPR informs a physician’s standard of care). Other states have similar laws. See Individual 
Right of Action for Medical Records Access: 50 State Comparison, HEALTH INFO. & L., 
http://www.healthinfolaw.org/comparative-analysis/individual-right-action-medical-records 
-access-50-state-comparison [https://perma.cc/NW6N-GGCQ] (last updated Apr. 3, 2013) 
(listing thirteen states using the HPR as a standard in patient right of access to medical records 
cases). 
 52. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a). 
 53. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 82,464. 
 54. See, e.g., Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 71–72 (Ga. 2008) (“HIPAA requires a 
physician to protect a patient’s health information . . . . Georgia law stands in sharp contrast  
. . . . It follows that HIPAA is more stringent and that it governs ex parte communications 
between defense counsel and healthcare providers.” (citing Allen v. Wright, 644 S.E.2d 814 
(Ga. 2007))). 
 55. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f), (i) (discussing exceptions for law enforcement and 
research, respectively). Exceptions differ from permitted disclosures of PHI that is otherwise 
covered by the HPR. 
 56. Id. §§ 160.103, 164.502(a), 164.508. 
 57. Id. § 160.103. 
2019] PROTECTING MEDICAL PRIVACY  1565 
 
an individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect 
to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be 
used to identify the individual.58  
“Covered entities” include health care providers who maintain electronic records 
(i.e., individuals and institutions providing and billing for health care), health care 
clearinghouses (i.e., firms that process health information into different formats), and 
health plans (i.e., providers or payors of health care).59 “Business associates,” or 
individuals or organizations performing services on behalf of covered entities that 
involve PHI, also are included.60 Once an entity is covered, all of its PHI is subject 
to the HPR, including that stored in paper files.61 
Covered entities must provide notice of the HPR to patients and may not disclose 
PHI unless “required,” “permitted,” or “authorized.”62 “Required” disclosures are 
made to patients or their legal representatives and for HHS enforcement purposes.63 
“Permitted” disclosures include those made to individuals or their representatives 
outside required disclosures; for medical treatment, billing, and health care 
operations; out of necessity to treat an incapacitated patient; incidental to a permitted 
use; and in the public interest, such as those required by law.64 Permitted disclosures 
generally are limited in scope to the “minimum necessary,” outside those made in 
the course of treatment or in the public interest.65 “Authorized” disclosures are made 
pursuant to patient consent to medical record requests, marketing requests, or sale of 
PHI.66 Authorized disclosures include releases made to third parties in litigation.67 
B. HIPAA Privacy Rule and Workers’ Compensation Proceedings 
The HPR applies to workers’ compensation proceedings, and disclosures of PHI 
may be permitted or authorized in that context. Physicians treating injured workers—
whether worker-selected or insurer/employer-appointed—are covered entities, and 
they generate medical records containing PHI. The HPR also may apply to workers’ 
compensation insurers or employers themselves, depending on whether they 
otherwise are covered entities, and to the business associates of such covered entities. 
If the HPR contained no additional language, it would be clear that the PHI of 
patients in workers’ compensation proceedings was protected under federal law. But 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. These services may include billing, claims processing, data analysis, and 
utilization review. Id. 
 61. Id. (describing PHI as information “[t]ransmitted or maintained in any . . . form or 
medium”).  
 62. Id. §§ 164.502(a), (i), 164.508, 164.520. 
 63. Id. § 164.502(a)(2), (4). 
 64. Id. §§ 164.502(a)(1), (3), 164.510(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)–(2), 164.512. 
 65. Id. § 164.502(b) (discussing when “minimum necessary” applies but not specifically 
defining it).  
 66. Id. § 164.508(a). 
 67. Id. § 164.508(a)(2)(i)(C). As part of their right to access their own medical records, 
patients in litigation also may request that their medical records be sent to third-party 
designees; these are considered “required” disclosures. Id. § 164.502(a)(2)(i). 
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the HPR also contains an exception for PHI disclosed during workers’ compensation 
proceedings in accordance with state law, which is the crux of the problem.  
1. Section 164.512(l)’s Exception for Workers’ Compensation  
and Other Permitted PHI Disclosures 
Disclosures to facilitate the administration of workers’ compensation claims are 
permitted disclosures under § 164.512(l) of the HPR. Section 164.512(l) states, “[a] 
covered entity may disclose protected health information as authorized by and to the 
extent necessary to comply with laws relating to workers’ compensation or other 
similar programs, established by law, that provide benefits for work-related injuries 
or illness without regard to fault.”68 The language that PHI disclosures may be made 
“to the extent necessary to comply with” state laws affecting workers’ compensation 
effectively translates to disclosures “necessary to administer claims” under state 
laws. In contrast, information that is unnecessary for the administration of claims 
must not be disclosed. Section 164.512(l) thus affords states broad latitude to protect 
workers’ medical privacy and to administrate workers’ compensation programs 
consistent with their historic roles in those areas. 
Typically, courts and legislatures find compliance with § 164.512(l) on two 
grounds. First, authorization is either assumed or provided at filing when the patient 
enters the workers’ compensation system.69 Second, the amount of PHI “necessary 
to comply with [state] laws relating to workers’ compensation” is determined entirely 
by existing state workers’ compensation and other state laws, no matter the level of 
protection.70 Missing from this analysis is states’ obligation to protect worker privacy 
in exchange for the broad latitude they have to implement their desired approaches 
under § 164.512(l). As argued in Part II, § 164.512(l) has been misinterpreted as a 
complete or very broad waiver of federal privacy protection. Consequently, courts 
have not preempted state laws failing to protect patients’ PHI in workers’ 
compensation proceedings.71  
Under the HPR, other permitted disclosures of PHI in the workers’ compensation 
process include those made for medical treatment as well as payment of treating or 
examining physicians.72 While “permitted” disclosures may be subject to the 
“minimum necessary” standard for disclosure under the HPR, “required” disclosures 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Id. § 164.512(l). This section applies to both state and federal workers’ compensation 
programs, though the focus of this Article is the legal conflict arising at the intersection of 
state workers’ compensation laws and HIPAA. See Standards for Privacy of Individually 
Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,542 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 
C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164) (discussing the application of § 164.512(l) to federal workers’ 
compensation programs under the Black Lung Benefits Act, Employees’ Compensation Act, 
Energy Employees’ Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act, and Longshore and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act). 
 69. See infra Section II.B. 
 70. See infra Section II.B. 
 71. See infra Section II.B. 
 72. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining “payment” to include reimbursement for physician 
services); id. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) (listing treatment under “[p]ermitted uses and disclosures” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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are not.73 Thus, states may alter the disclosure standard for PHI in workers’ 
compensation proceedings by permitting or requiring disclosure.74  
2. Authorized PHI Disclosures 
PHI also may be disclosed during the administration of a workers’ compensation 
claim pursuant to the HPR with valid, written authorization of the injured worker.75 
Under state law, authorization of PHI disclosures may be assumed by filing a 
workers’ compensation claim or otherwise compelled for claims to be 
compensable.76 An injured worker also could authorize disclosure of information that 
exceeds the scope of what is required under state law for the administration of her 
claim; such information might be useful, for example, in refuting an argument that 
she is not disabled.77  
Unfortunately, the language used by HHS may confuse parties and adjudicating 
bodies about what is “authorized,” “required,” or “permitted.” This is because HHS 
refers to “authorized” and “required” disclosures as “permissible,” meaning they are 
legal or allowed rather than “permitted.”78 Because these “permissible” disclosures 
are “authorized” or “required” disclosures, they are not subject to the minimum 
necessary standard for disclosure.79 
3. Scope of PHI Disclosure in Workers’ Compensation Proceedings 
 
a. State Restrictions 
While PHI disclosures generally are permitted during workers’ compensation 
proceedings under § 164.512(l), the scope of disclosure in particular instances is 
determined by state law. States choose whether to apply a “required” or “permitted” 
standard, and standards may differ across states as well as within states for different 
aspects of claim administration.80 While word choice is vital for protection, choice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. § 164.502(b)(2)(ii), (v)–(vi). 
 74. See infra Section I.B.3.a. 
 75. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508. 
 76. Id. § 164.512(l); see also infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 77. See NORTH CAROLINA MEDICO-LEGAL GUIDELINES § III(A)(2)(b) (N.C. BAR ASS’N 
2014) (“The scope of the authorization determines the scope of the inspection, release, copying 
or report. If the requesting attorney wants information beyond what is authorized to be 
released, the attorney must obtain additional authorization.”). 
 78. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,182, 53,199 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
 79. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(ii)–(iii), (v)–(vi). This nuance is easily misunderstood by 
adjudicating bodies. See, e.g., Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., No. 200106934, 2006 AK Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 135, at *1, *17–18, *21–22 (Alaska Workers’ Comp. Bd. May 25, 2006) (finding 
under a state statute mandating disclosure that “45 CFR 164.512(a) limits the amount of 
protected health information [sic] health care provider is allowed to disclose to the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the workers’ compensation purpose and to the full extent authorized 
by State or other law”). 
 80. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
53,198–99. 
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of language often does not appear deliberate, particularly when different parts of the 
same workers’ compensation statute use conflicting language.81 According to HHS, 
“[i]n many cases, the minimum necessary standard will not apply to disclosures made 
pursuant to [workers’ compensation] laws. In other cases, the minimum necessary 
standard applies, but permits disclosures to the full extent authorized by the workers’ 
compensation laws.”82 Even if disclosure is limited to the “minimum necessary” 
standard, no guidance is provided by the HPR or federal or state law about what that 
means in the context of workers’ compensation. Without guidance, physicians may 
rely on the statements of defense counsel or employers’ insurers that the information 
requested is the minimum necessary for the administration of a claim or for 
reimbursement of services rendered.  
HHS provides examples of how scope of disclosure requirements may differ. In 
Louisiana, disclosures are required and therefore not subject to the minimum 
necessary standard: 
[U]nder Louisiana workers’ compensation law, a health care provider 
who has treated an employee related to a workers’ compensation claim 
is required to release any requested medical information and records 
relative to the employee’s injury to the employer or the workers’ 
compensation insurer. . . . [S]ince such disclosure is required by law, it 
is permissible under the Privacy Rule at § 164.512(a) and exempt from 
the minimum necessary standard. The Louisiana law further provides 
that any information relative to any other treatment or condition shall be 
available to the employer or workers’ compensation insurer through a 
written release by the claimant. Such disclosure also would be 
permissible and exempt from the minimum necessary standard under the 
Privacy Rule if the individual’s written authorization is obtained . . . .83 
In Texas, part of the workers’ compensation statute requires disclosure, while 
another part permits it, which could result in PHI disclosures of different scope for 
the same claim:  
Texas workers’ compensation law requires a health care provider . . . to 
furnish records relating to the treatment or hospitalization for which 
compensation is being sought. Since such disclosure is required by law, 
it . . . is permissible under the Privacy Rule . . . and exempt from the 
minimum necessary standard. The Texas law further provides that a 
health care provider is permitted to disclose to the insurance carrier 
records relating to the diagnosis or treatment of the injured employee 
without the authorization of the injured employee to determine the 
amount of payment or the entitlement to payment. Since the disclosure 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 84 (citing Texas law).  
 82. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
53,199. 
 83. Id. 
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only is permitted and not required . . . . [T]he minimum necessary 
standard would apply . . . .84  
Thus, in Texas, disclosures under the same workers’ compensation law are subject 
to different rules about scope. HHS has not challenged this outcome under the HPR. 
These examples are noteworthy for a couple of reasons. To start, disclosures vary 
based on what may be the default rather than the deliberate word choice of state 
legislatures. Further, when a state statute requires disclosure of medical records to 
bring a workers’ compensation claim, the minimum necessary disclosure standard 
does not apply,85 and the full medical record “related to” an injury may be disclosed. 
This is the situation in both Louisiana and Texas when an injured worker who files 
for workers’ compensation requests reimbursement for medical expenses.  
In practice, varying state standards for the scope of PHI disclosure may have 
significant consequences for both the content of the medical records disclosed and 
the way disclosures are made. First, they may create inconsistences inter- and intra-
state with respect to the breadth of PHI disclosed for workers’ compensation 
purposes. More of a medical record may be released for a claim in one state where 
disclosure is required than in another state where it is permitted. Similarly, the scope 
of disclosure may vary within a state, if different aspects of workers’ compensation 
proceedings are subject to varying standards of disclosure. Second, varying state 
standards may affect the manner in which PHI is disclosed. In instances where the 
minimum necessary standard does not apply—that is, in required or authorized 
disclosure situations—some courts hold that employers or their legal counsel may 
engage in ex parte communications with treating or examining physicians without 
notice to, or the presence of, the injured worker or her counsel.86 
b. Provider Restrictions 
The scope of permitted and authorized disclosures under §164.512(l) (and the 
HPR in general) also may be influenced by medical providers. With respect to 
permitted disclosures, HHS states:  
[w]here a covered entity routinely makes disclosures for workers’ 
compensation purposes under 45 CFR 164.512(l) or for payment 
purposes, the covered entity may develop standard protocols as part of 
its minimum necessary policies and procedures that address the type and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2018). 
 86. See, e.g., Farr v. Riscorp, 714 So. 2d 20, 22–23 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
physician-patient privilege does not extend to workers’ compensation claimants in Louisiana, 
and ex parte communications between a treating physician and compensation carrier are not 
“confidential communications”); Simms v. Schabacker, 339 P.3d 832, 834, 836 (Mont. 2014) 
(holding that Montana’s disclosure statutes and a patient’s signed “Notice of Privacy Policy” 
authorized a physician’s ex parte communication and “thus provided an exception to the 
physician-patient privilege”); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 652–54 (W. 
Va. 1994) (allowing an ex parte conversation without notice when limited to PHI related to a 
claimant’s injury). 
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amount of protected health information to be disclosed for such 
purposes.87  
Thus, the content and scope of PHI disclosure could differ among physicians for the 
same workers’ compensation request based on different protocols.88 The content and 
scope of authorized disclosures also may vary based on common law informed 
consent requirements as well as what physicians believe to be in the best interests of 
patients therapeutically.89 
II. MEDICAL PRIVACY AND PREEMPTION CHALLENGES  
Having discussed the complexities of the relationship between the HPR and 
workers’ compensation, this Part examines the challenges in protecting workers’ 
privacy under the current legal scheme. Specifically, it addresses federal and state 
roles in protecting privacy and the difficulty in preempting state law that fails to 
protect injured workers’ privacy. The preemption challenges relate to a 
misperception about the relationship between the federal privacy right and states’ 
historic role in both protecting privacy and administering their own workers’ 
compensation programs.90 Because of this misperception, courts and legislatures 
wrongfully assume the HPR’s § 164.512(l) is a complete or very broad waiver of 
federal protections. Correcting this problem requires a better understanding of the 
federalism relationship at stake. The arguments in this Part foreshadow the 
importance of recognizing the relationship as “symbiotic,” whereby the federal and 
state governments are mutually dependent and must work together to protect privacy. 
“Symbiotic federalism” is discussed in Part IV. 
Part II is divided into three Sections. Section II.A provides background 
information about the HPR’s preemption provisions and presents arguments for 
preempting contrary state law bearing on workers’ compensation. Section II.B 
discusses why these preemption arguments would fail under current legislative and 
judicial treatment of § 164.512(l). The Section argues that § 164.512(l) is not a 
blanket privacy exception, and the HPR is intended to serve as a floor for privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DISCLOSURES FOR WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION PURPOSES 2 (Dec. 3, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr 
/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/workerscompensation.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/9SP7-RBJE]. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Informed consent in 
negligence may be based on a reasonable patient or a reasonable physician standard, the latter 
allowing the physician to be more paternalistic in determining materially relevant information 
to be disclosed. Id. at 786–87. Under either standard, a physician may invoke therapeutic 
privilege and act paternalistically to limit the information a patient receives, if she believes it 
may be detrimental to the patient’s physical or mental health. Id. at 789; see also Arato v. 
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 601, 607–08 (Cal. 1993) (upholding jury instructions about the 
reasonable patient informed consent standard “weighing the risks” of disclosure in a case 
where a physician did not want to give a cancer patient a “cold shower” with statistical 
mortality information that the patient’s estate claims was of material interest to his treatment 
decision). 
 90. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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protection. As a result, § 164.512(l) must be read “through” the HPR. To bolster this 
claim, Section II.C discusses HHS’ intent both to maintain privacy protections for 
injured workers consistent with the HPR and to allow states the opportunity to 
implement privacy protections in workers’ compensation proceedings. HHS 
assumed states are in a better position than the federal government to seek a balanced 
exchange of PHI between employees and employers. Thus, HHS intended for § 
164.512(l) to facilitate state workers’ compensation proceedings while maintaining 
injured workers’ privacy.  
A. HIPAA Privacy Rule’s Preemption Provision 
The HPR contains a standard preemption provision. The regulations state in 
pertinent part: “A standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted 
under this subchapter that is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the 
provision of State law.”91 “Contrary” is defined as follows:  
(1) A covered entity . . . would find it impossible to comply with both 
the State and federal requirements; or (2) The provision of State law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of part C of title XI of the Act, section 264 of 
Public Law 104–191, or sections 13400–13424 of Public Law 111–5, as 
applicable [i.e., HIPAA or the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act].92  
As a result, HHS intended state laws to stand unless they conflict with the HPR, in 
which case they are preempted. But courts have not found preemption in workers’ 
compensation cases and rarely hold that the HPR preempts state law in other 
contexts.93  
HHS’s choice of this standard preemption provision in the workers’ compensation 
context is important for a couple of reasons. First, it indicates that the HPR is meant 
to serve as a floor for privacy protections. HHS Secretary Donna E. Shalala 
emphasized this point before Congress prior to HIPAA’s enactment: 
“[C]onfidentiality protections . . . would be cumulative, and the Federal legislation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2018).  
 92. Id. § 160.202. 
 93. A few courts have found that the HPR preempts state law in contexts outside workers’ 
compensation. See, e.g., OPIS Mgmt. Res., LLC v. Sec’y, Fla. Agency for Health Care 
Admin., 713 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2013) (preempting Florida nursing home licensing 
statute section 400.145, which requires disclosure of medical records of deceased residents); 
Thomas v. 1156729 Ontario Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Unlike 
Michigan law, HIPAA does not allow for automatic waiver of the physician-patient privilege 
upon the filing of a lawsuit, therefore Michigan law is not ‘more stringent,’ and is superceded 
[sic] by HIPAA” (quoting Congress v. Tillman, No. 09-10419, 2009 WL 1738511, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. June 16, 2009))); Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004) 
(preempting less stringent Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act standards for ex 
parte communications in a medical malpractice case); Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 71 
(Ga. 2008) (preempting state law, including O.C.G.A. § 24-9-40(a), which allowed ex parte 
communications in medical malpractice actions). 
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would provide a floor. [It] should provide every American with a basic set of rights 
with respect to health information. All should be assured of a national standard of 
protection.” 94 As a result, states may enact laws that parallel the federal standard, but 
those that fall below it are preempted. Second, states may enact more stringent laws. 
The HPR contains an explicit exception for states offering stronger privacy 
protections than the HPR.95 This indicates HHS’s desire for robust state protection 
of privacy. Nevertheless, to date no state has enacted more stringent privacy laws in 
the workers’ compensation context.96 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Labor & Human Res., 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Donna E. 
Shalala, Secretary, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), https://aspe.hhs.gov/testimony 
-secretary-health-and-human-services-september-11-1997 [https://perma.cc/KL79-YLRT].  
 95. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b). The full list of exceptions follows: 
(a) [If a] determination is made by the Secretary . . . that the provision of State 
law: (1) Is necessary: (i) To prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision of 
or payment for health care; (ii) To ensure appropriate State regulation of 
insurance and health plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute or 
regulation; (iii) For State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or (iv) For 
purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare, 
and, if a standard, requirement, or implementation specification under part 164 
of this subchapter is at issue, if the Secretary determines that the intrusion into 
privacy is warranted when balanced against the need to be served; or (2) Has as 
its principal purpose the regulation of the manufacture, registration, distribution, 
dispensing, or other control of any controlled substances (as defined in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802), or that is deemed a controlled substance by State law. (b) The provision 
of State law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information 
and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or implementation 
specification adopted under subpart E of part 164 of this subchapter. (c) The 
provision of State law, including State procedures established under such law, as 
applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or 
death, or for the conduct of public health surveillance, investigation, or 
intervention. (d) The provision of State law requires a health plan to report, or to 
provide access to, information for the purpose of management audits, financial 
audits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or certification of 
facilities or individuals.  
Id. § 160.203. 
 96. A state law is defined as “more stringent” in the following circumstances:  
(1) With respect to a use or disclosure, the law prohibits or restricts a use or 
disclosure in circumstances under which such use or disclosure otherwise would 
be permitted under this subchapter . . . . (2) With respect to the rights of an 
individual, who is the subject of the individually identifiable health information, 
regarding access to or amendment of individually identifiable health information, 
permits greater rights of access or amendment, as applicable. (3) With respect to 
information to be provided to an individual who is the subject of the individually 
identifiable health information about a use, a disclosure, rights, and remedies, 
provides the greater amount of information. (4) With respect to the form, 
substance, or the need for express legal permission from an individual, who is 
the subject of the individually identifiable health information, for use or 
disclosure of individually identifiable health information, provides requirements 
that narrow the scope or duration, increase the privacy protections afforded (such 
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Courts have yet to engage in preemption analysis in the workers’ compensation 
context since, with limited exception, they have held that the HPR does not apply 
due to § 164.512(l).97 Meanwhile, preemption is indicated in three scenarios: state 
workers’ compensation laws directly conflict with the HPR, are construed by courts 
to conflict with the HPR, or result in processes that conflict with the HPR’s 
protections. State laws may directly conflict with the HPR, or courts may construe 
these laws to conflict with it, when the state statutory standard for privacy protection 
falls, or is interpreted to fall, below the federal one. State processes may conflict with 
the HPR when the administration of workers’ compensation claims results in privacy 
protections that drop below the federal standard, even when state privacy protections 
may be in place.  
If, as this Article proposes, the purpose of § 164.512(l) is not to eliminate federal 
privacy protections for injured workers but to facilitate the administration of 
workers’ compensation claims, preemption of some state workers’ compensation 
statutes is likely. Under the first part of the HPR’s preemption provision, the plain 
language or interpretation of current state laws may make “it impossible [for 
physicians or other covered entities] to comply with both the State and federal 
requirements.”98 This is because state workers’ compensation laws are concerned 
primarily with efficiency in administrating claims and the prevention of fraud, rather 
than protecting privacy.99 State laws may authorize or be interpreted to allow broad 
portions or the entirety of a medical record to be disclosed during workers’ 
compensation proceedings.100 This is inconsistent with the HPR’s requirements for 
                                                                                                                 
 
as by expanding the criteria for), or reduce the coercive effect of the 
circumstances surrounding the express legal permission, as applicable. (5) With 
respect to recordkeeping or requirements relating to accounting of disclosures, 
provides for the retention or reporting of more detailed information or for a 
longer duration. (6) With respect to any other matter, provides greater privacy 
protection for the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable 
health information. 
Id. § 160.202. 
 97. See, e.g., Jarmuth v. Cox, No. 1:07CV33, 2007 WL 2892957, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. 
Sept. 28, 2007) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) to dismiss a breach of confidentiality claim); 
Rigaud v. Garofalo, No. Civ.A.04-1866, 2005 WL 1030196, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2005) 
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) as “permitting the disclosure of health information made for 
workers’ compensation purposes without an individual’s authorization”); Buehler v. Indus. 
Comm’n of Ariz., No. 1 CA-IC 06-0062, 2007 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 293, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. May 22, 2007) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) and stating that “HIPAA does not preclude 
an employer or carrier from requiring receipt of a claimant’s medical records in order to 
determine workers’ compensation benefits”); Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 
55, 57 (Ga. 2012) (“[T]he [HIPAA] privacy provisions do not preempt Georgia law on the 
subject of ex parte communications because HIPAA exempts [via § 164.512(l)] from its 
requirements disclosures made in accordance with state workers’ compensation laws.”); 
Holtkamp Trucking Co. v. Fletcher, 932 N.E.2d 34, 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[The] federal 
privacy regulations [under § 164.512(l)] make an exception for workers’  
compensation . . . .”). 
 98. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. 
 99. See infra Section II.C. 
 100. See infra Section II.B. 
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restricted, if not minimum necessary, disclosure.101 Further, state laws that fail to 
limit ex parte communications in scope, or to provide notice provisions for such 
communications, also may violate the HPR.102 
Additionally, preemption might occur under the second part of the preemption 
provision, namely, when “[s]tate law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [HIPAA].”103 Undoubtedly, 
workers’ compensation laws are interpreted by courts to impose obstacles to 
applying the HPR to injured workers. Indeed, that is the premise behind the current 
legal interpretation of § 164.512(l) as a complete waiver of federal privacy 
protections.  
Section II.B addresses the limits of current judicial interpretation of § 164.512(l) 
for preemption purposes and proposes an alternative understanding of the 
relationship between that provision and state law pertaining to workers’ 
compensation.  
B. Judicial Interpretation of § 164.512(l) 
The current legal understanding of § 164.512(l) is that it excludes from HPR 
protections PHI disclosed during workers’ compensation proceedings. The first part 
of this Section examines cases interpreting § 164.512(l) as a complete federal privacy 
waiver. The second part discusses overturned or superseded decisions that, 
alternatively, seek to reconcile the administration of workers’ compensation claims 
with the HPR’s privacy protections. These courts do not assume that a worker has 
waived privacy rights by filing for workers’ compensation. The approach of these 
courts could be understood as reading the state workers’ compensation statues 
“through” the HPR. The U.S. Supreme Court has used this technique in Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) litigation to reconcile two possibly 
contradictory legal outcomes under different provisions of that statute.104 When one 
legal approach is read “through” another, it is understood in light of the overarching 
legal goal of the other provision; that goal may be complete field preemption in the 
ERISA context, or privacy protection in the HPR context.105 This technique could 
prove useful for simultaneously recognizing the HPR and states’ historic roles in 
protecting privacy and administering workers’ compensation programs. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b). 
 102. See id. § 164.502(i) (“A covered entity that is required by § 164.520 to have a notice 
may not use or disclose protected health information in a manner inconsistent with such 
notice.”); see also id. § 164.520(a)(1) (“[A]n individual has a right to adequate notice of the 
uses and disclosures of protected information that may be made by the covered entity, and of 
the individual’s rights and the covered entity’s legal duties with respect to protected health 
information.”). 
 103. Id. § 160.202. 
 104. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 217–18 (2004) (discussing how ERISA 
§ 514(b)(2)(A) might save a state law from preemption, while § 502(a) calls for preemption; 
“§ 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent to create an exclusive 
federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a)”). 
 105. See id.  
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1. Recognizing an Exception 
Most state boards of workers’ compensation106 and courts assume the  
HPR’s § 164.512(l) exception is a complete or very broad waiver of federal privacy 
protections.107 This understanding of the HPR is so pervasive that few courts even 
mention the exception before dismissing privacy claims. This in itself is a legal error, 
since any PHI disclosed outside the scope of a workers’ compensation claim—
however broadly that is defined by state law—is undoubtedly subject to HPR 
protections.108 At a minimum, a court must define and apply these boundaries. 
Failing to recognize the application of the HPR has led to some remarkable judicial 
decisions, including one where a court denied relief to a plaintiff who had medical 
information unrelated to his workers’ compensation claim disclosed pursuant to a 
falsified authorization form sent by his employer to a medical provider.109 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., Order, Appeal No. 2010019011 (Ga. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/sbwcdocs/google-shared/2010019011TrialAppeal.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/43Z4-7V5N], aff’g Order, Trial No. 2010019011 (Ga. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Sept. 
10, 2010) (finding no preemption and a “fairly broad waiver”); Order, Appeal No. 2010019219 
(Ga. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Dec. 29, 2010), http://s3.amazonaws.com/sbwcdocs/google 
-shared/2010019219TrialAppeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFE8-T6UU], aff’g Order, Trial No. 
2010019219 (Ga. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Dec. 1, 2001) (finding no preemption of state law and 
a waiver of privacy protections).  
 107. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balachandran, 76 A.3d 703, 712 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (finding 
no preemption and a complete waiver in a case where a worker submitted a medical claim to 
his employer for reimbursement, and the employer contacted the physician’s office directly 
and obtained medical information about his treatment because “[o]nce the plaintiff submitted 
a copy of his superbill to his employer, he relinquished the justified expectation that the 
document would not be publicly disclosed”); Holtkamp Trucking Co. v. Fletcher, 932 N.E.2d 
34, 45, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (acknowledging in both the majority and dissent that “federal 
privacy regulations make an exception for workers’ compensation”); id. at 50 (Myerscough, 
J., dissenting) (acknowledging the same); Riley v. F.A. Richard & Assocs., 16 So. 3d 708, 720 
n.16 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing an exemption for all workers’ compensation 
disclosures).  
Employers’ counsel and insurers also make this assumption. See, e.g., Letter from Trisha 
Holland Lindsay, Att’y, to Records Custodian, Hartford Ins. Grp. (Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with 
author) (redacted) (“[The claimant] shall be deemed to have waived any privilege or 
confidentiality regarding the claim or history or treatment that the employee has had with any 
medical provider, psychiatrist or psychologist.”); Letter from Iwona Patelska, Paralegal, to 
Cobb Outpatient Adult Servs. (Mar. 27, 2017) (on file with author) (“[W]e are requesting 
copies of any and all medical records . . . . Please note: this request complies with HIPAA 
regulation CFR § 164.512(l).” (emphasis omitted)); Letter from Angela D. Tartline, Att’y, to 
Dr. Sandea Greene-Harris, Med. Records Librarian (Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with author) 
(redacted) (“This request is not limited to medical records for the alleged injuries . . . in this 
workers’ compensation claim, but rather covers any medical treatment or examinations either 
before, on, or after this date which are in your possession.” (emphasis omitted)); Letter from 
Greg Wagner, Att’y, to Moin Kazi, Med. Doctor (Apr. 24, 2017) (on file with author) 
(redacted) (“As you may know medical records for treatment received pursuant to a Workers’ 
Compensation Claim are not subject to HIPAA.”). 
 108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) (2018). 
 109. Balch v. Pioneer Adjustment Servs., No. NNHCV136036452, 2013 WL 4779545, at 
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With a couple of notable exceptions, the few courts that discuss § 164.512(l) do 
so in a cursory fashion, simply stating that filing for workers’ compensation 
explicitly or implicitly, depending on the state’s process, waives federal medical 
privacy protections.110 The McRae v. Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc., litigation 
provides the most insight into judicial analysis of the provision.111 McRae, which 
involved the injured worker who was ordered by the state workers’ compensation 
board to consent to an ex parte conversation between her physician and her 
employer’s lawyers, questioned the application of the HPR to state workers’ 
compensation directly.112 Because Georgia’s workers’ compensation statute is silent 
about whether ex parte communications are allowed, the court had to determine 
whether the HPR and its restrictions on ex parte communications applied to workers’ 
compensation proceedings.113 The Superior Court held that HIPAA and the HPR are 
“inapplicable” to workers’ compensation proceedings.114 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the Superior Court and held that the 
state workers’ compensation statute “does not compel an employee to authorize her 
treating physician to talk to her employer’s lawyer ex parte in exchange for receiving 
benefits for a compensable injury,” thus protecting McRae’s medical privacy under 
both Georgia law and the HPR.115 The court found that, “[t]here is no wholesale 
exemption of the requirements of the Privacy Rule in workers’ compensation 
proceedings. To the contrary, the Privacy Rule applies in the context of such 
proceedings.”116 The court cited the plain language of §164.512(l) as “expressly 
permit[ting] the disclosure of information ‘as authorized by and to the extent 
necessary to comply’ with the requirements of workers’ compensation laws.”117  
                                                                                                                 
 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2013). The court held that “plaintiff’s causes of action against 
the defendants arose out of and occurred in the course of the workers’ compensation claims 
process . . . . Therefore, absent the application of an exception, these claims are barred [by 
state law]. . . . Here, the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants altered the authorization 
form without his knowledge and used it to obtain his confidential medical information is more 
akin to the conduct that courts have determined is not sufficiently egregious to warrant an 
exception . . . .” Id. at *3–4 (citations omitted). The court then distinguished a case where an 
employer used “aggressive surveillance tactics” causing emotional distress for the spouse of a 
worker who filed for workers’ compensation. Id. at *4 n.3 (citing Nordstrom v. GAB Robins 
N. Am., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-771 (RNC), 2012 WL 1094645, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2012)). 
But see Herman v. Kratche, No. 86697, 2006 WL 3240680, at *1, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
2006) (“[W]hen a covered entity makes a disclosure, it must be for a purpose stated under 
HIPAA and its regulations. . . . nor do we find any authority for an inadvertent disclosure 
under HIPAA.” (citations omitted)). 
 110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. 2012); McRae v. Arby’s 
Rest. Grp., Inc., 742 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); McRae v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 721 
S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). 
 112. McRae, 721 S.E.2d at 604. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 603. 
 116. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(l) (2018)). 
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The next step in the court’s reasoning is key. The court interpreted “to the extent 
necessary to comply with the requirements of workers’ compensation laws” to 
exclude ex parte communications on several grounds.118 The court reasoned in part 
that the scope of the employee’s waiver is limited to “[c]ommunications . . . the 
employee has had with any physician.”119 This includes medical records leading up 
to the hearing date.120 This time frame is significant for understanding where 
disclosures under state workers’ compensation statutes may end and state 
overreaching (and federal preemption) may begin. While the court found that the 
scope of the relevant medical record to be disclosed could not extend past 
conversations and information already in the written record, it unfortunately did not 
speak to the scope of disclosure within its approved time frame. 
The Georgia Supreme Court overturned this decision, arguing that while the 
Georgia workers’ compensation statute does not specifically address ex parte 
communications, they are allowed pursuant to the waiver of privacy associated with 
commencing a workers’ compensation claim.121 Because the Georgia statute is silent 
about the methods by which disclosures of “information” may be made, the court 
interpreted the statute to allow oral communications between the treating physician 
and the employer or her representatives.122 With respect to the HPR, the court simply 
cited § 164.512(l) and stated that “the [HIPAA] privacy provisions do not preempt 
Georgia law on the subject of ex parte communications because HIPAA exempts 
from its requirements disclosures made in accordance with state workers’ 
compensation laws.”123 The court distinguished the robust privacy protection 
afforded to patients in medical malpractice cases based on the state privacy waiver 
associated with workers’ compensation and “the goal of our workers’ compensation 
statute of providing equal access to relevant information within an efficient and 
streamlined proceeding so as not to delay the payment of benefits to an injured 
employee.”124 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relationship between the HPR 
and state workers’ compensation laws—indeed the current view in every state—is 
problematic. It assumes that the “to the extent necessary to comply with [state] laws” 
language of § 164.512(l) means that state legislatures may impose any standard for 
PHI disclosure they choose. Rather, the language, as this Article argues in Section 
II.C below, is intended to facilitate the efficient administration of workers’ 
compensation claims and to avoid frustrating state processes. Section II.B.2 presents 
an alternative view of the relationship between the HPR and state workers’ 
compensation statutes. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-207(a) (2017)).  
 120. Id. 
 121. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55, 56, 58 (Ga. 2012). 
 122. Id. at 56–57. 
 123. Id. at 57. 
 124. Id. at 57–58. 
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2. Reading State Workers’ Compensation Statutes “Through” the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule 
This Section presents an alternative understanding of the HPR and its relationship 
to state workers’ compensation statutes, which would bring medical privacy 
protections for injured workers more in line with those afforded to medical 
malpractice litigants. As the Georgia Court of Appeals indicated in McRae, the HPR 
and state workers’ compensation statutes are not mutually exclusive.125 The 
relationship may be viewed as symbiotic, whereby both federal and state law are 
needed to protect privacy in workers’ compensation. Federal standards are the floor, 
and, against that baseline, states may develop privacy protections that further the 
efficient administration of workers’ compensation claims. Under this interpretation, 
§ 164.512(l) may be read “through” the overall protections of the HPR and 
understood in terms of HHS’s goal to protect PHI with limited exception. In other 
words, § 164.512(l) facilitates disclosures necessary to administrate claims while 
maintaining privacy rights.  
Reading workers’ compensation statutes “through” § 164.512(l) has a couple of 
implications. First, state laws that conflict with the HPR should be preempted as 
“contrary” to it, unless doing so would frustrate the administration of workers’ 
compensation claims. This means that disclosures must be the minimum required for 
the efficient administration of such claims. Arguably, this could map onto “minimum 
necessary” disclosures. Recall that currently only state statutes that “permit” 
disclosures are subject to this standard, whereas states that “require” disclosures are 
not governed by the minimum necessary standard.126 Thus, one could argue that to 
support their stated goals of privacy protection under the HPR, HHS must revise their 
guidelines to impose the “minimum necessary” standard for PHI disclosure in 
workers’ compensation. But even if the minimum necessary standard is not imposed, 
states must adopt standards that restrict the PHI disclosed to that necessary for the 
efficient administration of claims. Similarly, applying the HPR to ex parte 
communications in workers’ compensation (in states where they are allowed) would 
impose requirements like notice and protective orders.127 
Second, to the extent that state workers’ compensation statutes do not address 
privacy protections or render them unclear, they must be read through the HPR, 
which assumes no PHI disclosure unless specified.128 As the McRae appellate court 
found, § 164.512(l) cannot be interpreted to allow ex parte communications when 
Georgia law is silent about such communications.129 Without notice requirements 
and other protections in this context, communications easily could involve physician 
disclosures of PHI that are unrelated to the claim and prejudicial.  
The Tennessee Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in Overstreet v. TRW 
Commercial Steering Division, which involved a state workers’ compensation statute 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See McRae v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 721 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). 
 126. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2018). 
 127. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2018) (establishing standards for disclosing PHI in 
litigation and administrative proceedings). 
 128. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.1, I.B.2 (discussing required, permitted, and authorized 
disclosures, respectively). 
 129. McRae, 721 S.E.2d at 604. 
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that failed to address ex parte communications.130 In holding that ex parte 
communications between an employer and a treating physician cannot occur without 
a waiver from the employee, the court reasoned that such communications could 
result in conflicts of interest with respect to employer-paid physicians, inadvertent 
disclosures of “sensitive or irrelevant medical information,” and related liability for 
physicians and employers.131 While the majority based its conclusions on an implied 
physician-patient covenant of confidentiality, concurring Judge Koch invoked the 
HPR:  
[E]mployees seeking benefits under the [Tennessee] Workers’ 
Compensation Act retain their privilege against the non-disclosure of 
their personal health information except to the extent that this privilege 
has been altered by federal [the HPR] or state law. Neither . . . requires 
or permits employers or their agents to have ex parte discussions with 
their employees’ treating physicians.132  
Judge Koch cited § 164.512(l) as a provision that simultaneously “explicitly exempts 
disclosures made in accordance with a state’s workers’ compensation laws” and does 
not support unrestricted disclosure of PHI in the context of workers’ 
compensation.133 Thus, Judge Koch reconciled the two approaches by situating the 
state workers’ compensation statute within the broader mandates of the HPR, 
effectively reading it “through” the privacy protections of the HPR.  
Understanding the relationship between state workers’ compensation statutes and 
the HPR in this manner protects workers’ privacy rights by making the HPR the legal 
floor for protection. This shields workers from being subject to judicial intuitions 
about the appropriate scope of disclosure. As discussed, judicial interpretations vary 
widely. In McRae, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted a statute that does not 
explicitly authorize ex parte communications as allowing them, arguably supporting 
broad PHI disclosure.134 Whereas in Overstreet, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
interpreted a similar statute as disallowing such communications,135 though the 
court’s opinion was later superseded by state statute.136 
Section II.C discusses HHS’s intent behind § 164.512(l) as supporting the “read 
through” approach outlined in this section. The agency intended the HPR to serve as 
a floor for privacy standards. Section 164.512(l) was meant to facilitate the efficient 
administration of workers’ compensation claims and to seek a balance between 
employers’ and employees’ interests in disclosure during that process, rather than to 
serve as a complete privacy waiver. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. 256 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2008). 
 131. Id. at 634. 
 132. Id. at 643 (Koch, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 133. Id. at 643 n.11. 
 134. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55, 57 (Ga. 2012). 
 135. Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 629, 636 (Tenn. 
2008); see also Hayes v. Am. Zurich Ins., No. E2010-00099-WC-R3-WC, 2011 WL 2039402, 
at *1 (Tenn. May 25, 2011). 
 136. Act of June 23, 2009, ch. 486, 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1 (codified as amended at TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(a)(2)(A) (LEXIS through 2019)) (allowing ex parte communications). 
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C. Health and Human Services’ Intent Behind § 164.512(l) 
HHS documents support the view that the agency intended for injured workers to 
maintain privacy protections under § 164.512(l). The agency discussed the goals of 
§ 164.512(l) as facilitating workers’ compensation proceedings and creating a 
balanced exchange between employers and employees. These goals are furthered by 
a symbiotic relationship between the HPR and state workers’ compensation 
statutes—namely, reading these state statutes through the HPR. 
1. Facilitating Administrative Proceedings 
The legislative record suggests that HHS intended § 164.512(l) to facilitate 
administrative proceedings, not to exempt injured workers entirely from federal 
medical privacy protections. HHS specifically described the purpose of § 164.512(l) 
as allowing states to “process or adjudicate claims and/or coordinate care under the 
workers’ compensation system.”137 In an earlier document, HHS discussed the 
relationship between the HPR and workers’ compensation as “[an] important 
national priorit[y],” presumably given the need to protect medical privacy while 
supporting states’ administration of workers’ compensation claims.138  
Most importantly, HHS added § 164.512(l) to the final HPR in 2002—two years 
after the rule was first published but before it was in force—following many 
comments on this topic.139 HHS responded to these comments, stressing the need to 
permit disclosures necessary to process claims:  
We agree that the privacy rule should permit disclosures necessary for 
the administration of state and other workers’ compensation systems. To 
assure that workers’ compensation systems are not disrupted, we have 
added a new provisions [sic] to the final rule. The new § 164.512(l) 
permits covered entities to disclose protected health information as 
authorized by and to the extent necessary to comply with workers’ 
compensation or other similar programs . . . .140  
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,182, 53,198 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
 138. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,462, 82,795 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
 139. The HPR was first published on December 28, 2000, after HHS received over 52,000 
public comments on the proposed rule issued on November 3, 1999. Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,182. HHS received over 
11,000 comments about the 2002 changes issued for public comment in March 2002. U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R2U6-SRXT]. Final modifications were published on August 14, 2002, which 
included the addition of § 164.512(l). Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,198. 
 140. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,707–08.  
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Nowhere during this period does HHS suggest that its intent is to eliminate wholesale 
the privacy rights of injured workers. 
Further, an early report of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
(NCVHS), a body that formally advises HHS pursuant to HIPAA’s section 1172(f), 
strongly supports the view that the HPR should facilitate administrative proceedings 
without eliminating privacy protections:  
Workers [sic] compensation is a complex subject that requires special 
treatment and reasonable accommodation. However, like other casualty 
insurance, it is not entitled to a complete exemption. The Department 
should not evade its responsibility to address these difficult issues by 
simply exempting them. If necessary, a separate and subsequent 
rulemaking should consider how to meet confidentiality interests of 
patients while allowing workers’ compensation to be administered 
efficiently.141  
HHS in fact received comments for a two-year period after this recommendation and 
prior to adopting § 164.512(l).142 
2. Seeking a Balanced Exchange Between Employees and Employers 
Further evidence that HHS did not intend § 164.512(l) to exclude injured workers 
from all federal privacy protections is that the HPR seeks to balance interests in 
disclosure with personal privacy. The “Purpose of the Administrative Simplification 
Regulations” of the HPR stresses balance, stating “[t]he task of society and its 
government is to create a balance in which the individual’s needs and rights are 
balanced against the needs and rights of society as a whole.”143 More specifically, 
“[n]ational standards for medical privacy must recognize the sometimes competing 
goals of improving individual and public health, advancing scientific knowledge, 
enforcing the laws of the land, and processing and paying claims for health care 
services.”144  
 “Balance” is discussed at length in the HPR as one of six approaches that HHS 
took in developing the rule.145 HHS speaks of balance between stakeholders’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics: Publication of Recommendations 
Relating to HIPAA Health Data Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,370, 42,371 (July 10, 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 142. See supra note 139. 
 143. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,468. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 82,471–74 (discussing balance as a factor in the agency’s rulemaking). 
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interests146 and others’ interests in privacy or disclosure.147 The HPR states that 
exceptions to privacy must “serv[e] a compelling need related to public health, 
safety, or welfare,” and “intrusion into privacy is warranted when balanced against 
the need to be served.”148  
Additionally, the function of § 164.512(l) itself is to balance privacy and 
disclosure: some PHI is disclosed in exchange for the efficient administration of, and 
compensation for, a work-related injury. In this scenario, both the employee and the 
employer are vulnerable. The employee is vulnerable to having stigmatizing or 
otherwise harmful medical information revealed, and the employer is vulnerable to 
exaggerated or false claims. Both parties may be disadvantaged by the financial and 
other resources consumed by an inefficient process. The employee desires 
meaningful, prompt compensation and the employer fair and timely administration 
of the claim. Ideally, the least PHI required to validate and to administrate a claim 
efficiently would be released. 
To be sure, some could argue that a privacy/disclosure imbalance between 
employees and employers is supported by a policy argument. The workers’ 
compensation system rests on the assumption that employers—as opposed to society 
(i.e., taxpayers), the government, or the injured worker herself—should bear the cost 
of accidents in the workplace.149 Given this legal posture, one could argue that to 
guard against fraud, the balance must be tipped toward employers when determining 
workers’ compensation.  
This argument fails on several grounds. The prevention of fraud need not involve 
a wholesale privacy waiver but only “necessary” disclosures. Further, the scale 
already is tipped in at least one way towards the employer: when forced into the 
workers’ compensation scheme, employees forgo the opportunity to litigate claims 
and to win potentially larger damage awards.150 Additionally, HHS understood 
disclosures necessary to prevent fraud as limited exceptions to, rather than a waiver 
of, privacy protections. HHS Secretary Donna Shalala gave testimony and lectures 
prior to the adoption of the HPR in which she described five principles behind the 
HPR: boundaries, security, control, accountability, and public responsibility.151 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Id. at 82,471 (“From the comments we received on the proposed rule, and from the 
extensive fact finding in which we engaged . . . . [w]e learned that stakeholders in the system 
have very different ideas about the extent and nature of the privacy protections that exist today, 
and very different ideas about appropriate uses of health information. This leads us to seek to 
balance the views of the different stakeholders, weighing the varying interests on each 
particular issue with a view to creating balance in the regulation as a whole.”).  
 147. Id. (“Neither privacy, nor the important social goals described by the commenters, are 
absolutes. In this regulation, we are asking health providers and institutions to add privacy into 
the balance, and we are asking individuals to add social goals into the balance.”). 
 148. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a)(1)(iv) (2018). 
 149. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOES THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM FULFILL ITS 
OBLIGATIONS TO INJURED WORKERS? 7 (2016) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, President, United 
States, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906)), https://www.dol.gov/asp 
/WorkersCompensationSystem/WorkersCompensationSystemReport.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/69BF-GMVN]. 
 150. Hodge, supra note 25, at 124–25. 
 151. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 94; Donna E. Shalala, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Harper Fellow Lecture at Yale University School of Law: Medical Privacy in 
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first four principles stress privacy, and the last—public responsibility—addresses 
limits to privacy rights, including disclosures necessary to prevent health care 
fraud.152 Speaking about disclosures for public responsibility, which she describes as 
“national priorities,”153 Shalala cautions, “[a]llowing access doesn’t mean we can 
forget about protecting privacy. And we shouldn’t.”154 She then outlined the limited 
areas where disclosures would be permitted under public responsibility: public 
health, research (de-identified PHI), and law enforcement.155 
Thus, HHS envisioned a cooperative regime, whereby state governments and the 
federal government work together to protect privacy. The HPR seeks to balance the 
interests of employers and employees in disclosure. And the legislative history of the 
HPR indicates that § 164.512(l) was added to aid states in the administration of their 
workers’ compensation programs, not to waive federal privacy protections 
completely. As a result, § 164.512(l) relies on states to address any gaps in privacy 
protection that bring the level of protection below the floor of the HPR. 
D. State Gaps in Protecting Privacy 
Section 164.512(l) assumes states will fill in gaps in privacy protections through 
constitutional, statutory, or common law, but they have not. State constitutions 
generally target government rather than private intrusions into privacy.156 Further, 
when there is evidence of the need for PHI disclosures and reasonable safeguards are 
in place, courts employ balancing tests that weigh government interests against 
personal ones.157 To the extent constitutional safeguards apply, the state’s interest in 
efficient administration of workers’ compensation claims is falsely viewed as 
impeded by privacy protections, and such protections are lifted.158 
                                                                                                                 
 
Post-Industrial America (Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Shalala, Medical Privacy] (transcript 
available in HHS archive); Donna E. Shalala, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Remarks at the National Press Club: Privacy–Health Care (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter Shalala, 
Privacy–Health Care] (transcript available in HHS archive). 
 152. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 94; Shalala, Medical Privacy, supra note 151; Shalala, 
Privacy–Health Care, supra note 151. 
 153. Shalala, Medical Privacy, supra note 151. 
 154. Hearing, supra note 94. 
 155. Id. 
 156. INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING 
HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 87 (Sharyl J. Nass, Laura A. Levit & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 
2009) (ebook) (“[W]ith limited exceptions, individuals are only protected against 
governmental intrusions into their personal health information and may not raise constitutional 
concerns about private action. Even when state action is involved, individuals rarely prevail 
on claims premised on constitutional rights to informational privacy because state interests 
generally outweigh the individual’s privacy interest.”); Hodge, supra note 25, at 129 
(explaining that state and federal “[c]onstitutional provisions only protect against breaches of 
privacy by government”).  
 157. Hodge, supra note 25, at 129. 
 158. See, e.g., Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Ga. 2012) (finding 
state constitutional privacy protections and other state laws do not preclude ex parte 
communications between a treating physician and an employer or their representatives in 
workers’ compensation proceedings). 
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State workers’ compensation and other statutes either exempt workers’ 
compensation proceedings from privacy protections or fail to provide meaningful 
protection. Although many workers’ compensation statutes contain language that 
formally limits the scope of PHI disclosure, in practice, administrative tribunals and 
courts construe the statutes to allow broad disclosures.159 Further, workers’ 
compensation statutes may allow ex parte communications, which could result in 
PHI being disclosed without boundaries and undue influence on treating or 
examining physicians.160 Meanwhile, state privacy statutes contain exceptions for 
workers’ compensation.161 This is true even for disease-specific laws, such as state 
genetic privacy statutes162 (which track the highly protective federal Genetic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. For example, in Arkansas, a statue expressly limits scope of disclosure and requires 
patient authorization for disclosure. See 099-00-1 ARK. CODE R. § 099.27 (LexisNexis 2019) 
(“Medical report filings should be limited to only those reports which provide information 
relative to diagnosis, prognosis, impairment ratings, and return to work information. The 
Commission may, at its discretion, request other medical information.”). On its face, this 
appears to be strong protection from broad PHI disclosure. But in Arnold v. Atkins Nursing & 
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., the administrative law judge held that “the Claimant has in fact 
waived her physician/psychotherapist privilege when she signed the approved Workers’ 
Compensation forms, as required by law. That claimant can not [sic] later invoke the 
physician/psychotherapist privilege in an Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Case after 
waiving it to make her claim . . . .” No. G406016, 2015 WL 3476549, at *7 (Ark. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n May 29, 2015). Similarly, in Louisiana, the state workers’ compensation 
statute states: “[i]n any claim for compensation, a health care provider who has at any time 
treated the employee related to the compensation claim shall release any requested medical 
information and records relative to the employee’s injury . . . . Any information relative to any 
other treatment or condition shall be available to the employer or his workers’ compensation 
insurer . . . .” LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1127(B)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2019). In Hortman v. Louisiana 
Steel Works, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the filing of a workers’ compensation 
claim destroys or takes away the physician-patient privilege because Louisiana Code of 
Evidence Article 510(B)(1) provides no privilege when the disclosure “relates to the health 
condition of a patient who brings or asserts a personal injury [or workers’ compensation] 
claim.” 696 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). Construing a Washington 
state statute similar to the one in Louisiana, the Washington Supreme Court held that “RCW 
51.04.050 abolishes the physician-patient privilege[] [i]n . . . industrial insurance” 
proceedings. Holbrook v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 822 P.2d 271, 274 (Wash. 1992) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.04.050 (West 2010)). Thus, in these and other 
states, the worker’s consent to disclosure is presumed to be a broad waiver of privacy rights. 
 160. See infra Section III.B. 
 161. Hodge, supra note 25, at 129–30; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.30(k) (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2019) (“The disclosure and use of the following medical information shall not be subject 
to the limitations of this part: Medical information and records disclosed to, and their use by, 
the Insurance Commissioner, the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care, the 
Division of Industrial Accidents, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, the Department 
of Insurance, or the Department of Managed Health Care.”). 
 162. Hodge, supra note 25, at 130; see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 729.6(9)(a) (2019) (“This 
section does not prohibit the genetic testing of an employee who requests a genetic test and 
who provides written and informed consent to taking a genetic test for any of the following 
purposes: a. Investigating a workers’ compensation claim under chapters 85, 85A, 85B, and 
86.”). 
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Information Nondiscrimination Act, which also does not apply to workers’ 
compensation when disclosures are premised on consent),163 and state statutes 
pertaining to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV status.164 
Additionally, state common law privacy doctrines fail to provide sufficient 
protection against harmful disclosures in the workers’ compensation context.165 This 
is because consent is a valid defense against PHI disclosures.166 Depending on the 
state, when filing for workers’ compensation, claimants either sign a waiver of 
privacy rights or a waiver is assumed.167 Generally consent must be “knowing” and 
“voluntary,”168 but since entry into a compulsory workers’ compensation system is 
not mandated in the sense that someone could choose to forgo compensation, it is 
legally considered “voluntary.”169 As for the “knowing” requirement, claimants may 
not always realize the scope of the PHI to be disclosed (especially in states with 
unenforced statutes that limit scope of disclosure), but it is doubtful this lack of 
knowledge would rise to the level of a legal violation. 
Part III examines through original empirical work what actions, with a focus on 
statutes, states have taken to protect injured workers’ medical privacy. The Part 
concludes that states have not sufficiently protected injured workers in this context. 
III. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE ACTION 
States may seek to fill the gaps in worker privacy protection in several ways, 
including limiting the scope of PHI disclosures, prohibiting ex parte communications 
between parties and treating or examining physicians, mandating notice with respect 
to ex parte communications, or requiring protective orders for PHI disclosure during 
such communications. States may provide these privacy protections via statutes, 
including workers’ compensation statutes, or common law.  
To date, no comprehensive survey exists regarding state legislative and judicial 
action to protect workers’ privacy during workers’ compensation proceedings. This 
Part summarizes a survey of state action in four major areas of PHI disclosure: scope, 
ex parte communications, notice of ex parte communications, and protective orders. 
This data was collected by running LexisNexis and Westlaw searches to identify 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 209, 122 
Stat. 881, 918–19 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-8 (2012)). 
 164. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2019) (HIV 
status); Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
7601–12 (West 2012). 
 165. See infra Part III. 
 166. See, e.g., Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga. 2012) (“Under . . 
. OCGA § 34-9-207(a), any privilege the employee may have had in protected medical records 
and information related to a workers’ compensation claim is waived once the employee 
submits a claim for workers’ compensation . . . .”). 
 167. See infra Section III.A. 
 168. See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981) (upholding an exculpatory 
agreement when plaintiff had knowledge of the risks associated with declining negligence 
insurance for skydiving and voluntarily assumed them). 
 169. See, e.g., Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 56 (upholding as valid a “signed [] form 
authorizing the release of medical information” provided in the process of applying for 
workers’ compensation). 
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statutory authority in each area. Administrative materials and cases also were 
consulted in some instances, including when the plain language of the statute did not 
provide an answer about a state’s response. The findings lean in one direction: 
despite the implicit understanding between the federal and state governments that 
states will supplement gaps in medical privacy protection resulting from  
§ 164.512(l), states offer limited protections for injured workers seeking workers’ 
compensation. 
While the overall trend seems clear, this study has some limitations. First, the 
research was performed over several years; while every attempt was made to keep 
the document current prior to publication, some changes may have occurred. Second, 
interpretation of statutory and other legal authority, especially given conflicting or 
ambiguous sources, is somewhat subjective. Third, state practice may depart from 
the plain language of legal sources. To address these limitations, citations are 
provided to all primary sources used to categorize states’ approaches. 
A. Scope of Disclosure 
States may choose to protect workers’ privacy by limiting the scope of PHI 
disclosed in workers’ compensation proceedings. All states have statutes addressing 
the scope of PHI disclosure,170 and seventy-four percent (thirty-seven states) have 
statutes or regulations that formally limit its scope.171 Thirteen states expressly do 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See infra notes 171–72. 
 171. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 
ALA. CODE § 25-5-77(b) (LexisNexis 2016); ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.095(h), 23.30.107(a) 
(2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-908 (Supp. 2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-516(a)(1) 
(2012); 099.00.1 ARK. CODE R. § 099.27 (LexisNexis 2019); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3762 (West 
Supp. 2019); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 41(d) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-47-203(1) 
(West Supp. 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(4)(c) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-
207(a), (b) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386-96(a)(3) (West Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN § 342.020(8) (LexisNexis 2011); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1127(A)–(B)(2); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 39-A, §§ 208(1), 309(2), 312(4) (Supp. 2018); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-
709(2)(a)(i)–(ii) (LexisNexis 2016); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 110.07(2)(b) (2019) (but see 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 152, § 20 (LexisNexis 2017)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.222, 
418.315(6), 418.385 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2157 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 176.138(a)-(b) (West 2018); MINN. R. 1420.2200(1)(C) (2019); MISS. CODE  
ANN. §§ 71-3-15, 71-3-66 (West 2009 & Supp. 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 287.210(3), (6) (West 
2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-604(2) (2017); MONT. WORKERS’ COMP. CT. R. 24.5.317(2) 
(adopted 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-120(4), 48-2704(11) (LexisNexis 2018); 230 
NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 6-001(C) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281-A:38, 281-A:21-b (Supp. 
2018); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Lab 503.01(b) (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-10-1(A) 
(West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 97-25.6, 97-27(a)(2) (West Supp. 2017); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 65-02-11, 65-05-30(2), 65-05-32 (2011 & Supp. 2017); OR. REV.  
STAT. §§ 656.260, 656.360 (2017) (but see Booth v. Tektronix, Inc., 823 P.2d 402, 406 (Or. 
1991)); 34 PA. CODE §§ 127.659(a), 131.61(a) (2019); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b)(11) 
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not limit the scope of PHI disclosed.172 Less than half of the states (twenty) require 
authorization for disclosure.173 Four of these states require authorization but do not 
limit the scope of disclosure.174 
The thirty-seven states that expressly limit the scope of PHI disclosure by statute 
do so by both using qualifying language to define relevant PHI and preserving a 
claimant’s privilege or confidentiality with respect to PHI unrelated to a claim. 
Qualifying language includes limiting disclosures to medical information that 
“relates” to or is “relevant” or “pertinent” to the injury underlying the claim.175 As 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-95(A)–(B) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 62-2-19, 
62-4-1.3, 62-4-45 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(a)(2)(A) (LEXIS through 2019); 
TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0800-02-07-.06 (2018); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.025(d) (West 
Supp. 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-407(2)(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE r. 612-300-10(C)(1)–(3) (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 655a (2016); 13-4 VT. CODE 
R. § 1:3.0000 (Westlaw through Feb. 2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 51.04.050, 51.36.060 
(West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-7 (LexisNexis 2017); W. VA. CODE R. § 85-20-8 
(2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.13(1)(d)(3), 102.175 (West Supp. 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 
27-14-502(d), 27-14-610 (2017). 
 172. These states include: Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. CONN. GEN. STAT.  
ANN. § 31-294f(b) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2343(c) (West 2013); IDAHO CODE 
§ 72-432(11) (2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West Supp. 2018); Lakin v. 
Skaletsky, No. 08 C 842, 2008 WL 4662846, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2008); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 22-3-3-6 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 86.38, 86.45(l) (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-550b(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 2017); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 51-9-19(b)(3) (2009); Russell v. Bank 
of Am., No. 1,012,015, 2004 WL 1810318, at *4 (Kan. Workers Comp. App. Bd. July 30, 
2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 616C.010, 616C.140 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
34:15-15.3, 34:15-128.3(a) (West 2011); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 110-a (McKinney 
2016) (but see Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4123.651(B) (LexisNexis 2015) (but see OHIO ADMIN. CODE. 4123-6-20(F)(2) (2019)); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 58(A)(1) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-604(A), 65.2-
607(A) (2017).  
 173. These states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See ALASKA 
STAT. § 23.30.107(a); Arnold v. Atkins Nursing & Rehab Ctr., Inc., No. G406016, 2015 AR 
Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 241, at *1 (Ark. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n May 29, 2015) (discussing 
physician/psychotherapist privilege); 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-3:5-4(C) (2019); 19-1000-
1331 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 11.4 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-207(b) (2017); HAW. CODE R. 
§ 12-10-30(a) (LEXIS through 2019); Tom v. First Am. Title Co., No. 22222, 2001 Haw. App. 
LEXIS 97, at *3–4 (Haw. Ct. App. May 2, 2001); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8(a); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN § 342.020; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-709; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
71-604(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281-A:38, 281-A:21-b; N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Lab 
503.01(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15.3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-30(2); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4123.651(B); State ex rel. Holman v. Dayton Press, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 (Ohio 
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-95(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-1.3; UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
r. 612-300-10(C)(1)–(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 655a(c); 13-4 VT. CODE R. § 1:3.0000; W. 
VA. CODE R. § 85-20-8; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-14-502(d), 27-14-610. 
 174. These states are Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio. See supra note 172. 
 175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(4)(c) (“An employee who reports an injury or 
illness alleged to be work-related waives any physician-patient privilege with respect to any 
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discussed in Part II, in practice these limits are interpreted by courts to allow 
disclosure of large portions of a worker’s medical history. 
Authorization of PHI disclosures is not required in most states. While 
authorization is not predictive of the scope of PHI disclosure, it adds another formal 
layer of privacy protection, if only to alert the claimant that PHI disclosures will be 
made. Specific authorization for PHI disclosures is required in twenty states.176 Five 
states expressly assume authorization with the filing of a workers’ compensation 
claim.177 Authorization is implicitly assumed in the remaining twenty-five states. 
Several other types of laws may bear on the scope of disclosure. At least ten states 
allow the employer, rather than the claimant, to choose the physician providing the 
examination and diagnosis for workers’ compensation purposes.178 This situation 
may affect PHI disclosure if physicians, employed by or affiliated with the firm 
where the worker was injured, are more willing to disclose larger amounts of PHI to 
employers and their representatives than physicians unrelated to the employer. Also, 
at least nine state workers’ compensation statutes expressly exempt physicians from 
liability for unauthorized disclosure of medical records.179 This eliminates the 
primary legal incentive to restrict PHI disclosure, especially when disclosing a full 
                                                                                                                 
 
condition or complaint reasonably related to the condition for which the employee claims 
compensation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(a)(2)(A) (“It is the intent of the general 
assembly that . . . the parties and the department have reasonable access to the employee’s 
medical records and medical providers that are pertinent to and necessary for the swift 
resolution of the employee’s workers’ compensation claim.”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 41(d) 
(“All aspects of all physical and/or psychological comprehensive medical-legal evaluations, 
including history taking, shall be directly related to contested medical issues as presented by 
any party or addressed in the reports of treating physician(s).”). 
 176. See supra note 173. 
 177. These states include: Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-604(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-30(2); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 42-15-95(A); W. VA. CODE R. § 85-20-8; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-502(d). 
 178. These states include: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-77(a) (LexisNexis 
2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(2)(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-4(a)–(b) (West 2014); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 85.27(1), (4) (West Supp. 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510h(a)–(b), (e) (Supp. 
2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 287.140(1), (10) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15.3 (West 
2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-25.6(a)–(d) (West Supp. 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, 
§ 64(A), (B)(1), (7) (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-509(A) (2019).  
 179. These states include Alabama, Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-77(b) (“A 
physician, hospital, medical clinic, rehabilitation service, or other person or entity providing 
written statement of professional opinion or copies of records pursuant to this subsection shall 
not be liable to any person for a claim arising out of the release of medical information 
concerning the employee.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-30(3)(a)–(b) (“If a health care provider 
furnishes information or an opinion under this section: a. That health care provider does not 
incur any liability as a result of furnishing that information or opinion. b. The act of furnishing 
that information or opinion may not be the sole basis for a disciplinary or other proceeding 
affecting professional licensure. However, the act of furnishing that information or opinion 
may be considered in conjunction with another action that may subject the health care provider 
to a disciplinary or other proceeding affecting professional licensure.”). 
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record is more efficient than disclosing a partial one based on dates, events, or 
conditions.  
Some states explicitly authorize physicians to comply with employer requests for 
PHI disclosure.180 This not only interferes with patient privacy, it disrupts the 
practice of medicine. Physicians may be forced to engage in disclosures of PHI that 
they view as violating the law or their professional or other ethical codes.181 
Further, some workers’ compensation statutes contain statement of purpose 
clauses that emphasize the efficient administration of claims rather than medical 
privacy.182 These clauses may be viewed by courts as a reason not to restrict PHI 
disclosure.183 
What do these findings mean for the privacy protection of injured workers? A 
little less than a third of states considered and dismissed the need to limit PHI 
disclosure. A little more than two-thirds sought to address privacy by limiting scope 
of disclosure (though case law suggests that these efforts are ineffective due to 
judicial interpretation of § 164.512(l) and the implementation of state laws governing 
privacy).184 Sixty percent of states do not believe consent through authorization is 
necessary for PHI disclosure in the context of workers’ compensation. While it is 
unclear how much protection authorization provides other than notice of PHI 
disclosure, it is an additional safeguard and demonstrates legislative recognition of 
privacy issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-120(4) (LexisNexis 2018) (“All physicians and 
other providers of medical services attending injured employees shall comply with all the rules 
and regulations adopted and promulgated by the compensation court and shall make such 
reports as may be required by it at any time and at such times as required by it upon the 
condition or treatment of any injured employee or upon any other matters concerning cases in 
which they are employed. All medical and hospital information relevant to the particular injury 
shall, on demand, be made available to the employer, the employee, the workers’ 
compensation insurer, and the compensation court.”); Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae, 734 
S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga. 2012) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-207(a) for the proposition that an 
employer may request from a treating physician “all information and records related to” the 
employee’s claim).  
 181. For example, in Arby’s Restaurant Group, an injured worker (McRae) was ordered by 
the state workers’ compensation board to consent to her physician speaking with her employer’s 
lawyers. Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 56. McRae refused to comply with the order without 
her attorney being present for the conversation. Id. Her treating physician, who did not want to 
disclose medical information about her patient in this manner, also refused to speak with the 
employers’ lawyers. Id. Ultimately the communication was ordered by the court, though the court 
noted McRae’s physician may request her own or McRae’s attorney be present. Id. at 58. 
 182. See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 313.1 (McKinney 2016) (“To provide a fair, 
timely, and efficient mechanism for processing uncontroverted claims involving minor 
injuries, uncontested issues within a claim, and certain penalties.”); Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 
S.E.2d at 58 (“We believe a complete prohibition on all ex parte communications would be 
inconsistent with the policy favoring full disclosure in workers’ compensation cases, as well 
as the goal of our workers’ compensation statute of providing equal access to relevant 
information within an efficient and streamlined proceeding so as not to delay the payment of 
benefits to an injured employee.”).  
 183. See supra note 182. 
 184. See supra Section II.B. 
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B. Ex Parte Communications 
Ex parte communications are those that occur to “benefit . . . one party only, and 
without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an adverse interest.”185 In the 
workers’ compensation context, ex parte communications typically are between one 
party and a treating or examining physician. Issues may arise for the claimant when 
these communications occur between the claimant’s treating or examining physician 
and the employer, the employer’s counsel, the employer’s workers’ compensation 
insurance carrier, or another agent of the employer. Issues may arise for the employer 
when the communications take place between a treating or examining physician and 
the claimant, her counsel, or another agent of the claimant.  
Results vary among the states, with more allowing ex parte communications than 
disallowing them. Over half of the states (thirty-three) allow ex parte 
communications in some contexts between a party and a treating or examining 
physician, either pursuant to a workers’ compensation statute or case law.186 Seven 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 186. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-77(b) (LexisNexis 2016); Ex parte 
Smitherman Bros. Trucking, Inc., 751 So. 2d 1232, 1237 (Ala. 1999); Woodward v. Twin 
Cities Veterinary Clinic, Inc., No. 201117536, 2013 AK Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, at *30 (Alaska 
Workers’ Comp. Bd. Jan. 14, 2013) (but see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.30.095 (2016)); Salt 
River Project v. Indus. Comm’n, No. 1 CA-IC 90-122, 1992 WL 383021, at *1, *7 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Dec. 29, 1992); cf. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm’n, Op. 99-03, Communication with 
Witnesses; Ex Parte Communications; Physicians (Apr. 1999), 
http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=497 [https://perma.cc 
/4MYL-ZC8Y]; Arnold v. Atkins Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., No. G406016, 2015 AR. Wrk. 
Comp. LEXIS 241, at *1, *20 (Ark. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n May 29, 2015); Nelson v. 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., No. F706791, 2009 WL 570943, at *1, *4 (Ark. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n Mar. 2, 2009); Colo. Bar Assoc., Op. 71, Ex Parte Communications with 
Treating Physicians (Sept. 21, 1985) (addendum issued 1992), http://www 
.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/repository/ethicsOpinions/FormalEthicsOpinion_71_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/25T8-URHB]; 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-3:18-6(A) (2019) (but see 7 
COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-3:11-6(A) (2019) (“During the DIME process, there shall be no 
communication allowed between the parties and the DIME physician unless approved by the 
Director, or an administrative law judge. Any violation may result in cancellation of the 
DIME.”)); 19-1000-1331 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 11.4 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(4)(c) 
(West 2009); S & A Plumbing v. Kimes, 756 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-207 (West 2017); Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 56–57; IDAHO CODE 
§ 72-432(11) (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-6 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.27 (West 
Supp. 2018); Morrison v. Century Eng’g, 434 N.W.2d 874, 875–76 (Iowa 1989); Base v. 
Raytheon Aircraft Co., 329 P.3d 540 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Redrick v. S & J Painting, No. 
1,049,017, 2013 WL 1876335, at *1, *7 (Kan. App. Bd. Div. Workers’ Comp. Apr. 3, 2013); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1127(C)(1) (Supp. 2019); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510(b)(1)–(2)(a) 
(2018); Farr v. Riscorp, 714 So. 2d 20, 23, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1998); MD. CODE REGS. 
14.09.07.04 (LexisNexis 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.138(a) (West 2018); Hinson v. Miss. 
River Corp., No. 94-19422-F-4717, 1996 WL 34900915, at *1, *13-14 (Miss. Workers’ 
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states expressly prohibit or limit ex parte communications without consent by statute 
or case law.187 Ten states do not address whether ex parte communications are 
                                                                                                                 
 
Comp. Comm’n Aug. 1, 1996); MISS. WORKERS’ COMP. EDUC. ASS’N, 2018 MISSISSIPPI 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS GUIDE 80 (James M. Anderson et al. eds., 2018), 
https://acblaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Binder1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS42 
-PPV3] (allowing ex parte communications only in noncontroverted cases); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 39-71-604(2), 50-16-527(4), 50-16-805(1) (2017); Malcomson v. Liberty Nw., 339 P.3d 
1235, 1243 (Mont. 2014); Simms v. Schabacker, 339 P.3d 832, 834, 836 (Mont. 2014); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-120 (LexisNexis 2018); Scott v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., 714 N.W.2d 23, 
35-36 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006); Bryant v. Drivers Mgmt., Inc., No. 1737, 2004 WL 1085511, at 
*1 (Neb. Workers’ Comp. Ct. Jan. 8, 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616D.330(1) (LexisNexis 
2012); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Lab 503.01(c) (2019); Emp’r: Crucible, No. 6960 8263, 
60102681, 2002 WL 31650656, at *2 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Nov. 18, 2002); Alterra, No. 
7000 7727, 2002 WL 31273429, at *1 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Oct. 4, 2002); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 97-25.6(c)(2)–(3) (West Supp. 2017) (but see id. § 97-27(a)(3) (West Supp. 
2017) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 97-25.6 to the contrary, an employer or its 
agent shall be allowed to openly communicate either orally or in writing with an independent 
medical examiner chosen by the employer regardless of whether the examiner physically 
examined the employee.”)); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Albus, 572 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1977) 
(but see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 4.6(C) (West 2016) (“(1) Direct or indirect ex parte 
communications with court appointed professionals [including independent medical 
examiners] regarding specific cases or claimants are prohibited . . . .”)); OR. REV. STAT. § 
656.252 (2017); Booth v. Tektronix, Inc., 823 P.2d 402, 409 (Or. 1991); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 5-37.3-4(b)(8)(ii) (West Supp. 2018); Pitre v. Curhan, No. CIV.A.00-0053, 2001 WL 
770941, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 10, 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-95(B) (2015); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-45 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-2-3 (2016); Sowards v. Hills 
Materials Co., 521 N.W.2d 649, 651–54 (S.D. 1994); Citibank v. McDowell, Declaratory 
Ruling, S.D. DEP’T LAB. & REG. (Aug. 26, 2006), https://dlr.sd.gov/employment 
_laws/decisions_declaratory_rulings/62_4_1_44_45.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EUU-E5LD] (but 
see Dean v. Angostura Irrigation Dist., No. 207, 1990/91, 1991 WL 525010, at *1 (S.D. Dep’t 
Labor Oct. 29, 1991) (“In light of the strong reasons supporting denial of ex parte contact by 
attorneys and lack of express statutory language allowing the same . . . authorization shall be 
limited to medical records and shall expressly forbid ex parte contact between opposing 
counsel and the physicians.”)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(a)(2)(A) (LEXIS through 2019); 
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.0041(d) (West 2015); 13-4 VT. CODE R. § 1:3.2140 (2015) 
(amended 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-607(A) (2017); Wiggins v. Fairfax Park Ltd. P’ship, 
470 S.E.2d 591 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); VA. WORKERS’ COMP. COMM’N, VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION GUIDELINES 5 (2015), http://vwc.state.va.us/sites/default/files/documents 
/Vocational-Rehabilitation-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLH2-Z5GR]; WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 51.04.050, 51.36.060 (West 2010); Holbrook v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 822 P.2d 
271, 274–75 (Wash. 1992); WORKERS’ COMP. ADVISORY COMM., SPECIAL MEETING LABOR & 
INDUS., MEETING MINUTES (2008), http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Files/Wcac/Minutes 
/2008/WcacMtgMin20080617.pdf [https://perma.cc/56CN-77W5]; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-
4-7 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE R. § 85-20-8.5 (2018); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 
S.E.2d 648, 653, 657 (W. Va. 1994). 
 187. These states include: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4062.3(g) (West Supp. 2019); CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 10718 (2003); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 120 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Alvarez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 114 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Malafronte v. Med-Ctr. Home Health Care Emp’r, 
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allowed, in the sense that state law does not seem to provide a general rule about ex 
parte communications.188 It is possible in these states that courts could interpret 
legislative silence or general scope of disclosure laws as allowing ex parte 
communications. Some courts have held that because a state workers’ compensation 
law does not expressly prohibit ex parte communications, they are allowed.189 
The fact that ex parte communications between a party and a treating or examining 
physician are completely or partially prohibited in only seven states indicates a lack 
of state privacy protection in this context. PHI disclosures may not be limited in ex 
parte communications, and such communications may pressure a treating or 
examining physician to alter her diagnosis or other assessments of a patient. Further, 
employers or their agents may be allowed to hold ex parte communications in states 
where the workers’ compensation statute is silent on the issue.190 The treatment of 
ex parte communications in workers’ compensation stands in stark contrast to other 
areas of the law, such as medical malpractice, where ex parte communications 
between a party and a treating or examining physician are restricted under the 
HPR.191 In fact, the same state may require notice of meeting and protective orders 
for ex parte communications during medical malpractice litigation but allow such 
communications during workers’ compensation proceedings without protective 
measures.192 
                                                                                                                 
 
No. 03888 CRB-07-98-09, 1999 WL 692467, at *1, *3 (Conn.Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Aug. 
31, 1999); STATE OF CONN. WORKERS’ COMP. COMM’N, PAYOR AND MEDICAL PROVIDER 
GUIDELINES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF MEDICAL SERVICES (2010), https://wcc.state 
.ct.us/download/acrobat/payor-provider-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5LB-KX4J] 
(prohibition between payor and attending physician); Hydraulics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 768 
N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 11A(2) (LexisNexis 2017); 
452 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.14(2) (2019); Paganelli, No. 030073-02, 21 Mass. Workers’ Comp. 
Rep. 9, 16–17, 2007 MA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 4, at *14–15 (Reviewing Bd. Mass. Dep’t Indus. 
Accidents Feb. 6, 2007); Gomez v. Nielson’s Corp., 894 P.2d 1026, 1029–31 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995); State v. Altru Health Sys., 729 N.W.2d 113, 120 (N.D. 2007); Pa. State Univ. v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sox), 83 A.3d 1081, 1092 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (applying 34 
PA. CODE §§ 131.61(a) and 131.70(c) in prohibiting ex parte contact between a treating 
physician who is an employee of the claimant’s employer and claimant’s employer) (but see 
Heacock v. Sun Co. Inc., 38 Pa. D. & C. 4th 1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1998) (“[Given] the rationale 
supporting the prohibition against unauthorized ex parte contacts, this court believes that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would at least require reasonable 
notice to a plaintiff or his counsel before defense counsel may communicate with plaintiff’s 
treating physician.” (emphasis omitted))).  
 188. These states include: Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.   
 189. See, e.g., Woodward, 2013 AK Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, at *30 (citing previous caselaw 
in holding that “an employee must allow his or her treating doctors to meet informally on an 
ex parte basis with the employer” under Alaska’s workers’ compensation statute, which does 
not explicitly address such communications (citations omitted)); Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d 
at 57 (holding that ex parte communications are allowed under Georgia’s workers’ 
compensation statute, which does not explicitly address them). 
 190. See supra note 189. 
 191. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 192. Compare Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. 2008) (prohibiting ex parte 
communications in medical malpractice actions), with Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 57 
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C. Notice  
States may limit PHI disclosure by requiring notice of ex parte communications 
between a party and a treating or examining physician in workers’ compensation 
proceedings. “Notice” is generally defined as “[a] legal notification or warning that 
is delivered in a written format or through a formal announcement.”193 In the 
workers’ compensation context, notice to a noncommunicating party about an ex 
parte communication may be prior to or contemporaneous with its occurrence, 
though advance notice is most meaningful to allow the noncommunicating party to 
seek protections for PHI disclosure. Twelve states require notice of ex parte 
communications during workers’ compensation proceedings,194 with seven of those 
                                                                                                                 
 
(allowing ex parte communications during workers’ compensation proceedings). 
 193. Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 194. These states include: Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, and West 
Virginia. See 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-3:11-6(A) (2019); Colo. Bar Assoc., Op. 71, Ex 
Parte Communications with Treating Physicians, supra note 186; 19-1000-1331 DEL. ADMIN. 
CODE § 11.6 (2018); MD. CODE. REGS. 14.09.07.04(E) (LexisNexis 2019) (vocational 
rehabilitation practitioner); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.138(a) (West 2018); Hinson v. Miss. 
River Corp., No. 94-19422-F-4717, 1996 WL 34900915, at *1, *13–14 (Miss. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n Aug. 1, 1996); MISS. WORKERS’ COMP. EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 186; 
Malcomson v. Liberty Nw., 339 P.3d 1235, 1241–42 (Mont. 2014) (holding that “the provision 
of § 39-71-604(3) . . . permit[ting] an agent of the insurer to communicate directly with a 
physician or other healthcare provider and receive ‘relevant healthcare information’ without 
prior notice to the claimant or her authorized representative or agent” was unconstitutionally 
broad); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Lab 503.01(c) (2019); Alterra, No. 7000 7727, 2002 WL 
31273429, at *3 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Oct. 4, 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-
25.6(c)(2)–(3) (West Supp. 2017) (but see id. § 97-27(a)(3) (“Notwithstanding the provisions 
of G.S. 97-25.6 to the contrary, an employer or its agent shall be allowed to openly 
communicate either orally or in writing with an independent medical examiner chosen by the 
employer regardless of whether the examiner physically examined the employee.”)); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 42-15-95(B) (2015); 13-4 VT. CODE R. §§ 1:3.0000, :3.2140 (Westlaw through 
Feb. 2019); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 652 (W. Va. 1994) (but see W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-7(b) (West 2006) (“[A] claimant irrevocably agrees by the filing of his 
or her application for benefits that any physician may release to and orally discuss with the 
claimant’s employer, or its representative, or with a representative of the commission, 
successor to the commission, other private carrier or self-insured employer, whichever is 
applicable, from time to time, the claimant’s medical history and any medical reports 
pertaining to the occupational injury or disease and to any prior injury or disease of the portion 
of the claimant’s body to which a medical impairment is alleged containing detailed 
information as to the claimant’s condition, treatment, prognosis and anticipated period of 
disability and dates as to when the claimant will reach or has reached his or her maximum 
degree of improvement or will be or was released to return to work.”)). Section 23-4-7(b) 
contains a note, which cites Morris and states, “This section does not specifically authorize 
oral discussions by an employer with a claimant’s treating physician concerning a claimant’s 
medical condition, and finding otherwise would circumvent the public policy principles 
behind recognizing a fiduciary relationship between a patient and a physician.” W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 23-4-7(b) (citation omitted). 
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states appearing to require advance notice.195 Twelve states address notice but do not 
require it.196 Notice is unaddressed, meaning state law does not seem to provide a 
general rule about notice during workers’ compensation proceedings, in nineteen 
states that do not prohibit ex parte communications.197  
Thus, states widely lack privacy protections with respect to notice requirements 
for ex parte communications. The possibility of broad PHI disclosure due to lack of 
notice exists in at least thirty-one states; that is, those states that allow ex parte 
communications (thirty-three) or are silent on the matter (ten) minus those that 
require notice (twelve). 
D. Protective Orders 
States could require protective orders for disclosure of PHI during ex parte 
communications between a party and a treating or examining physician. California 
requires protective orders for mental health records.198 Protective orders are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. These states include: Colorado, Delaware, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia. See supra note 194. 
 196. These states include: Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. See Miller v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, No. 200606082, 2013 AK Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 9, at *19 (Alaska Workers’ Comp. 
Bd. Jan. 14, 2013); STATE OF CONN. WORKERS’ COMP. COMM’N, supra note 187, at 10; FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 440.13(4)(c) (West 2009); S & A Plumbing v. Kimes, 756 So. 2d 1037,  
1038–39, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (but see Adelman Steel Corp. v. Winter, 610 So. 2d 
494, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 440.13(4)(c)); Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 58; IDAHO CODE § 72-432(11) (2017); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 85.27(2) (West Supp. 2018); Morrison v. Century Eng’g, 434 N.W.2d 874, 875 
(Iowa 1989); KY. R. CIV. P. 26.03; 803 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 25:010 (2016); Reisinger v. 
Grayhawk Corp., 860 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); Farr v. Riscorp, 714 So. 2d 20 
(La. Ct. App.. 1998); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1127 (Supp. 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
616D.330(1) (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 616D.450 (2018); Booth v. Tektronix, 
Inc., 823 P.2d 402 (Or. 1991), Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-154, 
Contacting Adverse Expert Witness in a Workers’ Compensation Proceeding (last updated 
2016), https://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2005-154.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L7D-P6NJ]; 
Sowards v. Hills Materials Co., 521 N.W.2d 649, 651–52 (S.D. 1994); Wiggins v. Fairfax 
Park Ltd. P’ship, 470 S.E.2d 591 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); West v. Southside Reg’l Indem. Ins. 
Co., No. VA00000743432, 2014 WL 686891 (Va. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Feb. 19, 2014); 
VA. WORKERS’ COMP. COMM’N, supra note 186; In re Gish, No. 89 0914, 1990 WL 264229, 
at *1 (Wash. Bd. Indus. Ins. App. Dec. 7, 1990). 
 197. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See supra note 186.   
 198. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 36.5(e) (2019) (“Whenever such a mental health record 
is filed by a party at the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, the party filing such a record 
shall request and obtain a protective order from a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law 
Judge that shall specify in what manner the mental health record may be inspected, copied and 
entered into evidence.”). Judges may enter protective orders in other situations. CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 5708 (West 2011) (“All hearings and investigations before the appeals board or a 
workers’ compensation judge . . . . shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules 
of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and 
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addressed but not required in twenty-six states, meaning state law does not seem to 
provide a general rule about requiring protective orders.199 This includes states with 
rules about protective orders that are not applied in the workers’ compensation 
context. Some states, like Alaska, allow the workers’ compensation board discretion 
in issuing protective orders.200 Twenty-three states fail to address protective 
                                                                                                                 
 
records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out 
justly the spirit and provisions of this division.”). 
 199. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 81(a)(31); Ex parte 
Smitherman Bros. Trucking, Inc., 751 So. 2d 1232, 1237 (Ala. 1999); ALASKA  
STAT. §§ 23.30.107, 23.30.108(a) (2016); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.095(b) (2018); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1026(F) (2016); COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Powderhorn Coal Co. v. 
Weaver, 835 P.2d 616, 620 (Colo. App. 1992); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(c)(4): Escutia v. 
Greenleaf Prods., Inc., 886 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); GA. CODE  
ANN. § 34-9-207(a) (2017); Arby’s Rest. Grp., 734 S.E.2d at 58; IND. R. TRIAL P. 28(F); 
Discovery Under the New Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure and Workers’ Compensation Cases, 
News and Updates, IOWA WORKFORCE DEV., http://www 
.iowaworkcomp.gov/news-and-updates [https://perma.cc/NN2F-PFKY]; Base v. Raytheon 
Aircraft Co., 329 P.3d 540, 547 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); LA. STAT.  
ANN. § 23:1127(B)(1)(d) (Supp. 2019); Doucet v. Crowley Mfg., 846 So. 2d 875, 879–80 (La. 
Ct. App. 2003); Pearl v. East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 665 So. 2d 169, 171 (La. Ct. App. 
1995); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 110.07(2)(b) (2018); MINN. R. 1420.2200 subpt. 6 (2019); Mid-
Delta Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 749 So. 2d 379, 387–88 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 287.140(7) (West 2016); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 70-4.120(4)(F) (2018); 
State ex rel. McConaha v. Allen, 979 S.W.2d 188, 189–90 (Mo. 1998); State ex rel. Maloney 
v. Allen, 26 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.5.316(1), 24.5.325(2) 
(2018); 53 NEB. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4-001.02A, -006.02A (2019); Bryant v. Driver’s Mgmt., No. 
1737, 2002 WL 31256348, at *1 (Oct. 7, 2007); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §§ 118, 
300.33(8)(iii) (McKinney 2016); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103 notes to decision 50 (Consol., LEXIS 
through 2019 released Chs. 1–32, 50–59) (AIDS-related information); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 97-25.6(d)(4) (West Supp. 2017); 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 23A.0410 (2019); State v. Altru 
Health Sys., 729 N.W.2d 113, 120 (N.D. 2007); Collins v. Interim Healthcare of Columbus, 
Inc., No. 13-CA-00003, 2014 WL 80482, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2014); Randall v. 
Cantwell Mach. Co., No. 12AP-786, 2013 WL 3341201, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 2013); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 317(E) (West 2016), OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 810:10-5-31(c) 
(2019); R.I. WORKERS’ COMP. CT. R. 2.13(B) (Orders for the Protection of Parties and 
Deponents); Johnson v. C.G. Sargeant’s Sons Corp., No. C.A. 77-3864, 1979 WL 200311, at 
*1, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 1979); Sowards v. Hills Materials Co., 521 N.W.2d 649, 652 
(S.D. 1994); Dean vs. Angostura Irrigation Dist., No. 207, 1990/91, 1991 WL 525010, at *1 
(S.D. Dept. Lab. Oct. 29, 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5-311(a), 50-6-239(e) (2015 & Supp. 
2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-236 (2014); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0800-02-21-.16(2) 
(2018); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 602-2-1(A)(9) (2019); 16 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-50-20 (2019); 
WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 81. 
 200. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.107 (2016) (“Upon written request, an employee shall provide 
written authority to the employer, carrier, rehabilitation specialist, or reemployment benefits 
administrator to obtain medical and rehabilitation information relative to the employee’s 
injury. The request must include notice of the employee’s right to file a petition for a protective 
order with the division . . . .”); id. at § 23.30.108(a) (“If an employee objects to a request for 
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orders.201 Clearly, with almost all states failing to require protective orders, they 
remain an unused tool to limit PHI disclosures. In contrast, protective orders are 
routinely used in medical malpractice cases to uphold HPR protections.202 
 
TABLE: NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE ACTION 
 
Scope of Disclosure Expressly Limited 37 
Not Expressly Limited 13 





Not Addressed 10 
Notice Required 12 
Addressed but Not Required 12 
Not Addressed 19 
N/A Ex Parte Prohibited 7 
Protective Orders Required 1 
Not Required 26 
Not Addressed 23 
                                                                                                                 
 
written authority under AS 23.30.107, the employee must file a petition with the board for a 
protective order within 14 days after service of the request.”); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE  
tit. 8, § 45.095(b) (2018) (“If after a prehearing the board or its designee determines that 
information sought from the employee is not relevant to the injury that is the subject of the 
claim, a protective order will be issued.”); see also infra note 260 and accompanying text 
(discussing in camera inspection of records in Ohio). 
 201. These states include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., Arnold v. Atkins Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., No. 
G406016, 2015 AR. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 241, at *1, *20 (Ark. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n May 
29, 2015) (assuming without discussion that a protective order was not required); Nelson v. 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., No. F706791, 2009 WL 570943, at *1, *4 (Ark. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n Mar. 2, 2009) (same). The Arkansas rules of evidence and procedure, 
including those governing protective orders, generally do not apply to workers’ compensation. 
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-705 (2012). 
 202. See, e.g., Thomas v. 1156729 Ont., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785–86 (E.D. Mich. 
2013) (“Protective orders permitting ex parte interviews generally must meet several 
requirements. First, the protective order must prohibit the defendants from disclosing the 
plaintiff’s protected information outside the scope of the litigation. Second, the protective 
order must require the defendants to return or destroy the protected information when the 
litigation concludes. Third, some judges also require the protective order to contain ‘clear and 
explicit’ notice to the plaintiff’s physician about the purpose of the interview and that the 
physician is not required to speak to defense counsel. These are all sensible requirements and 
they advance the goals of HIPAA.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
2019] PROTECTING MEDICAL PRIVACY  1597 
 
E. Conclusion: Not Minding the Gap 
Thus, while HHS may have envisioned a scenario whereby states fill in the gaps 
in privacy protection created by § 164.512(l), it has not occurred. State response is 
limited and varied. In fact, the only protection that exists in a majority (a little over 
two-thirds) of states is a limit on the scope of PHI disclosure. Unfortunately, as 
described in Part II, those limits are routinely interpreted by courts to allow broad 
PHI disclosure that effectively amounts to a privacy waiver.203 
IV. “SYMBIOTIC FEDERALISM” AND PROTECTING MEDICAL PRIVACY IN WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION 
As Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate, injured workers filing for workers’ 
compensation often forgo medical privacy protections. This results from both a 
misinterpretation of the HPR’s § 164.512(l) as a complete or very broad waiver of 
privacy and states’ failure to otherwise protect workers’ privacy while administrating 
workers’ compensation claims.204 As part of a solution, Part II argues courts must 
read state workers’ compensation laws “through” the HPR, as the HPR is a floor for 
privacy protections.205 In this regard, § 164.512(l) and state workers’ compensation 
laws have a symbiotic relationship; both levels of government are needed to protect 
privacy in the workers’ compensation context. This requires states to strike a balance 
between the efficient administration of workers’ claims and protecting their 
privacy—a task they may be in a better position to do than HHS. Thus, states must 
fill in any gaps in privacy protection created by § 164.512(l). Unfortunately, the 
empirical study described in Part III indicates both an inconsistent and inadequate 
state response to protecting privacy. 
This lack of privacy protection for workers is likely based on more than a problem 
of “statutory” interpretation.206 At play are strong, historic divisions between the 
states and the federal government. Long before the HPR, medical privacy was a 
function of state law.207 And despite discrete examples of federal involvement, states 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. See supra Section II.B. 
 204. See supra Section II.B (discussing judicial interpretation of § 164.512(l)); supra Part 
III (providing a survey of state efforts to protect privacy in workers’ compensation 
proceedings). 
 205. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 206. The HPR is a regulation, not a statute, but similar principles apply with respect to 
interpretation. 
 207. INST. OF MED., supra note 156, at 86 (“Prior to HIPAA, health information in the 
clinical setting was protected primarily under a combination of federal and state constitutional 
law, as well as state common law and statutory protections.”) In fact, one commentator 
suggests that federal privacy protections are not politically viable for workers’ compensation 
because “[f]ailed attempts by Congress beginning in the 1970s to nationalize workers’ 
compensation through the federal passage of minimum standards suggest that the division of 
governmental powers may thwart federal attempts to apply broad privacy principles to 
workers’ compensation.” Hodge, supra note 25, at 140 (citations omitted). But arguably 
nationalizing workers’ compensation standards removes the administrative power from the 
states altogether, whereas maintaining privacy protections does not. 
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always administered their own workers’ compensation programs.208 Whether 
Congress intended to federalize medical privacy with HIPAA is debatable, but 
arguably the development and implementation of the HPR has resulted in something 
close to that outcome.  
So there is, in this sense, a federalism struggle between states’ claims to 
administrate workers’ compensation programs and to protect workers’ privacy in the 
spirit of the Tenth Amendment and federal privacy protection under the HPR 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.209 This is so, even though state workers’ 
compensation programs are not constitutionally protected.210 Workers’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. See Hodge, supra note 25, at 131–32; Ann Clayton, Workers’ Compensation: A 
Background for Social Security Professionals, 65 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 7 (2003–2004), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4p7.html [https://perma.cc/H4WZ-MZ7W]. 
 209. Hodge, supra note 25, at 131–32 (discussing federalism challenges pre-HIPAA); 
Christopher Howard, Workers’ Compensation, Federalism, and the Heavy Hand of History, 
16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 28, 30 (2002) (“Such an explanation hinges on the considerable power 
of federalism to influence policy debates in the United States. By the time policymakers gave 
serious thought to involvement by the national government, workmen’s [sic] compensation 
laws were so firmly entrenched in the states that major change was politically costly. States’ 
compensation laws created a textbook example of a ‘preempted policy space.’”); HIPAA, 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg note (2012) (Congressional Findings Relating to Exercise of Commerce 
Clause Authority; Severability). 
 210. Some support exists for a more foundational state constitutional challenge. Printz v. 
United States and New York v. United States make clear that the states cannot be 
commandeered by the federal government. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) 
(“The Federal Government may [not] . . . command the States’ officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that “[t]he Federal Government may not 
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”). An argument could 
be made that imposing federal privacy protections on states’ workers’ compensation programs 
rises to the level of commandeering state administrative agencies and thereby raises Tenth 
Amendment concerns. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
771–72 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the unconstitutionality of “forc[ing] federal 
procedures on state regulatory institutions”). But it is unlikely that requiring such privacy 
protections would be viewed as commandeering the state regulatory process of workers’ 
compensation because it would not impose federal procedures on states. If states choose to do 
nothing, the HPR serves as a floor for privacy protection. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (discussing a similar situation with respect to 
mining regulations under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977). 
Another line of cases suggests that protecting privacy in the workers’ compensation context 
may invoke more classic issues of federalism than the federal-state distinction. In Armstrong 
v. Exceptional Child Center Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that Medicaid providers cannot 
sue states to enforce section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act regarding reimbursement rates under 
the Supremacy Clause, in equity, or under the Medicaid statute itself. 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387 
(2015). Private parties instead must seek relief from HHS, which may put a noncompliant state 
on notice of violations and subsequently withdraw Medicaid funding. Id.; see also Douglas v. 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 616 (2012) (remanding to consider whether 
providers could challenge, under the Supremacy Clause, California statutes reducing payments 
when Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services determined the statutes were consistent 
with federal law). Both arguments merit exploration elsewhere. 
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compensation could in fact be federalized, and debate continues around that topic.211 
Thus, the interpretation of the federal and state government boundaries under the 
HPR relies on “‘soft’ federalism,” defining government roles in an extra-
constitutional sense.212 According to Abbe Gluck, these boundaries “may be more 
important to understanding what ‘federalism’ means today than the Constitution, 
particularly because formal constitutional law no longer frequently operates to police 
the boundaries of state and federal power.”213 
This type of federalism struggle in the administration of workers’ compensation 
claims may have several implications. First, it might explain why § 164.512(l) has 
been misinterpreted by judges and legislators; perhaps they believe the 
administration of workers’ compensation should be left at all costs to the states. 
Second, and for the same reason, it tells a story about why HHS has failed to remedy 
the situation.  
Third, it paradoxically refutes the argument that nothing should change by 
highlighting both federal restrictions and built-in protections for states. The HPR 
serves as a floor or limit for states, allowing them only to develop parallel or more 
stringent protections. Meanwhile, by delegating privacy protection to the states under 
§ 164.512(l), the federal government affords a layer of protection to states against 
overly aggressive implementation of the HPR. Thus, HHS’s intervention to remedy 
privacy failures in workers’ compensation within the confines of existing state 
systems could be viewed as consistent with states’ traditional roles in protecting 
privacy and administering workers’ compensation. 
An important insight into the federalism at play is that it requires cooperation and 
mutual dependence. Protecting privacy in the workers’ compensation context 
requires the participation of both the federal and state governments. The federal 
government sets the floor for protection upon which the states may rely, but it 
delegates power to the states to protect privacy.214 States are in the best position to 
know what gaps in privacy protection exist in the administration of their own 
programs as well as when disclosures are necessary for the efficient administration 
of claims. In this way, the two levels of government are mutually dependent to 
protect privacy in workers’ compensation. This understanding of the federalism 
relationship gives rise to a type of federalism this Article terms “symbiotic 
federalism.”  
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 149, at 24–25 (recommending the 
consideration of a federal workers’ compensation commission and federal standards); Karen 
C. Yotis, Federalization of Workers’ Comp: Politics, Opt-Outs and Survival of the State-Based 




 212. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 574 (2011). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Hearing, supra note 94 (“Federal legislation would provide a floor. Federal 
legislation should provide every American with a basic set of rights with respect to health 
information. All should be assured of a national standard of protection.”). 
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Section IV.A introduces the concept of “symbiotic federalism” and situates it in 
the context of workers’ compensation. It discusses symbiotic federalism as a 
cooperative scheme that has some similarities to, but is broader than, traditional 
notions of “cooperative federalism.” Under symbiotic federalism, if states fail to 
protect workers’ privacy, the federal government must step in.  
In light of symbiotic federalism, Section IV.B outlines federal action to protect 
workers’ privacy. States must be encouraged by HHS to comply with the spirit of the 
HPR—namely, allowing only narrowly tailored PHI disclosures to facilitate 
workers’ compensation claims. Given current confusion over the meaning  
of § 164.512(l), HHS must, at a minimum, clarify through a policy statement or 
amendment to the HPR that this provision is not a complete waiver of federal privacy 
protections. If the agency chooses to go further, it could amend the HPR to clarify 
its intent with respect to the scope of PHI disclosure and ex parte communications. 
HHS also could consider requiring “permissive” instead of “mandatory” PHI 
disclosures for workers’ compensation, which are subject to the “minimum 
necessary” disclosure standard; as explained in Section I.B.3.a, states currently 
choose their own standards. Regardless of the extent to which HHS seeks to clarify 
or to strengthen protections, if state law continues to violate the HPR’s requirement 
for narrowly tailored PHI disclosures, it must be preempted. 
Section IV.C suggests some other measures states may take to narrow the scope 
of PHI disclosure. These include requiring notice and protective orders for ex parte 
communications, if they continue to be authorized by state law and not prohibited by 
HHS. 
A. “Symbiotic Federalism” 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “symbiosis” as “1. the living together in 
more or less intimate association or close union of two dissimilar organisms (as in 
parasitism or commensalism); especially: mutualism, [and] 2. a cooperative 
relationship (as between two persons or groups).”215 Symbiosis is a biological 
concept that recognizes cooperation may be based on many different, complex 
relationships.216 Benefit levels and conditions of participation may vary between the 
two entities cooperating.217 Cooperation may be obligate (required) or facultative 
(optional) for either or both entities.218  
The flexibility of the concept of symbiosis is useful for conceptualizing the 
federalism challenges involved in protecting injured workers’ medical privacy. 
Under current law, both the federal and state governments are tasked with protecting 
medical privacy within the confines of their respective powers. The actions of one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. Symbiosis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/symbiosis [https://perma.cc/5RU4-3TQS]. 
 216. See generally Philip Hunter, Entente Cordiale: Multiple Symbiosis Illustrates the 
Intricate Interconnectivity of Nature, 7 EMBO REP. 861 (2006) (discussing complex symbiotic 
relationships in nature involving two or more organisms). 
 217. Eva Boon, Conor J. Meehan, Chris Whidden, Dennis H.-J. Wong, Morgan G.I. 
Langille & Robert G. Beiko, Interactions in the Microbiome: Communities of Organisms and 
Communities of Genes, 38 FEMS MICROBIOLOGY REV. 90, 92 (2014). 
 218. Id. 
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level of government influences the other. In this sense, the federal and state 
governments are mutually dependent to protect privacy, and cooperation is obligate. 
The HPR establishes the baseline for privacy rights for the states but relies on 
individual states to determine how best to protect privacy while facilitating the 
efficient administration of workers’ compensation claims under their individual 
rules.219 The HPR is premised on federal power to protect medical privacy under the 
Commerce Clause.220 The states historically protected medical privacy and managed 
workers’ compensation programs in the spirit of their reserved Tenth Amendment 
powers.221 In sum, the task of protecting privacy is shared by the federal and state 
governments in light of concerns about the efficient administration of workers’ 
compensation claims.  
Both levels of government benefit from the traditional division of powers. The 
states benefit by being able to administer their workers’ compensation programs 
efficiently. The federal government benefits from the states’ on-the-ground ability to 
protect medical privacy in that process. The framework is cooperative in nature, but 
there is no federal oversight of state workers’ compensation programs. 
To avoid conflict between states’ traditional role in administering workers’ 
compensation and protecting privacy and federal protection of privacy, two scenarios 
must occur: federal privacy protections must allow for the states’ administration of 
workers’ compensation claims, and state workers’ compensation programs must 
narrowly tailor PHI disclosures to protect privacy pursuant to the HPR. As discussed 
in Parts II and III, the challenges for privacy protection arise with respect to the latter. 
When the symbiotic relationship functions well, states will craft and implement 
privacy protections that guard against the release of PHI that is unnecessary for the 
administration of workers’ compensation claims. In this scenario, one might expect 
a “race to the top,” in the sense that greater privacy protection in some states will 
increase privacy protection in others.222 For example, if New York is able to operate 
a workers’ compensation system efficiently with broad privacy protection and no ex 
parte communications, then greater PHI disclosure and ex parte communications 
may not be necessary for the successful operation of workers’ compensation regimes. 
This dynamic could advance the federalism relationship that the HPR was designed 
to promote.  
When the symbiotic relationship fails to function well, and PHI is disclosed that 
is unnecessary for the administration of workers’ compensation claims, the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. See supra Section II.C. 
 220. See HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg note (2012) (Congressional Findings Relating to 
Exercise of Commerce Clause Authority; Severability); Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient 
Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 600 (2004) (“HIPAA and the Privacy Rule 
have survived at least three legal challenges to date. . . . [including] a Tenth Amendment 
challenge that it goes beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause power to regulate an issue 
generally left to the states.”). 
 221. See Crihfield, supra note 40; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE 
SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 49, 55, 58, 61, 80–87, 90–91, 224, 315 
(1999). 
 222. I am grateful to Robert Schapiro for this point. Cf. infra note 230 (discussing 
California as a “super-regulator”). 
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government must step in. HHS must assist states in protecting workers’ privacy by 
providing clear guidance about federal requirements to tailor PHI disclosures 
narrowly. HHS also must provide states resources to facilitate their development of 
workers’ compensation programs that honor federal privacy goals. This might 
include guidance about the HPR itself as well as assessments of existing or proposed 
workers’ compensation programs.  
Thus, symbiotic federalism relies on a concept of cooperation that is similar but 
distinct from some commonly discussed forms of “cooperative federalism.” To 
begin, theories of cooperative federalism envision a relationship between the federal 
and state governments that is more restrictive in scope.223 Two types of regulatory 
frameworks are considered cooperative federalism: conditional grants to states that 
require spending in accordance with federal priorities, and conditional preemption 
whereby states are tasked with carrying out federal programs.224 In the latter context, 
states must submit a qualifying implementation plan to the government.225 Under 
both understandings of cooperative federalism, the state “steps in the shoes” of the 
federal government and therefore creates federal law.226 
Neither situation is strongly analogous to the federalism challenges in the 
workers’ compensation context.227 Despite some notable exceptions for disability 
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 859–
60, 866 (1998). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 866. 
 226. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–96 (2001). 
 227. Erwin Chemerinsky’s interpretation of cooperative federalism as applied to marijuana 
regulation is perhaps most analogous. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper 
& Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 
(2015). Chemerinsky recommends allowing interested states to “experiment with novel 
regulatory approaches while leaving the federal prohibition intact for the remaining states.” 
Id. at 78. Specifically, he advocates that the federal government “adopt a cooperative 
federalism approach that allows states meeting [specified federal] criteria . . . to opt out of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act” requirements. Id. at 78–79. Presumably with this approach, 
some states will legalize marijuana in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. While the 
coexistence of federal and state law in marijuana regulation is analogous to privacy protections 
in workers’ compensation, the HPR should serve as the baseline standard for regulation in the 
latter context. Similarly, Alice Kaswan proposes applying cooperative federalism to climate-
change legislation. Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change 
Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 792 
(2008). Kaswan emphasizes the need for federal regulators to work with states to develop 
implementation plans primarily because the federal government cannot achieve its goal 
working alone. Id. The cooperative federalism framework also has been extended to police 
reform. Additionally, Kami Chavis Simmons recommends that Congress use its spending 
power to require states receiving federal grant funding for law enforcement to enact legislation 
promoting police accountability. Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police 
Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. 
REV. 351, 357 (2011). States that fail to adopt such legislation would forfeit five percent of 
federal funds. Id. Further, cooperative federalism has been extended to issues between federal 
and state courts, where a federal court can certify state law questions for relevant state courts. 
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and black lung, federal funds typically do not play a role in state workers’ 
compensation.228 States also are not seeking to carry out a federal program with a 
qualifying implementation plan. Further, the federalism challenges in workers’ 
compensation arise due to unclear boundaries between federal and state powers 
protecting privacy, rather than varying state decisions about voluntary compliance 
with federal programs.229 State management of workers’ compensation may 
encroach on privacy rights just as underenforcement of federal privacy rights may.230 
                                                                                                                 
 
See generally Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-
Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181 (2010). Cooperative and symbiotic 
federalism share a key feature: they envision a balance between federal preemption 
(“preemptive federalism”) and distinct federal and state regulatory powers (“dual federalism”). 
Weiser, supra note 226, at 1697. Under preemptive federalism, “federal courts interpret 
federal enactments or defer to federal agency action as preempting all state action in a field.” 
Id. “Dual federalism regimes, by contrast, separate federal and state authority into two 
uncoordinated domains,” where state governments exercise powers without federal 
interference. Id. 
 228. See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers’ Compensation and the 
Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 121 n.1 (1994). 
 229. This differs from theories of “balanced federalism,” where there is a “tug of war” that 
arises when state and federal actors regulate within the “interjurisdictional gray area,” or an 
area that implicates both state and national concerns. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of 
War Within: Seeking Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. 
REV. 503, 516–17, 644 (2007). Specifically, the interjurisdictional gray area is “one whose 
meaningful resolution demands action from both state and federal regulatory authorities, either 
because neither has all of the jurisdiction necessary to address the program as a legal matter, 
or because the problem so implicates both local and national expertise that the same is true as 
a factual matter.” Id. at 510. Rather, in the workers’ compensation context, regulatory 
boundaries are simply unclear. Once these boundaries are clarified, both the federal and state 
governments may realize their goals within their traditional domains. Further, at issue with 
balanced federalism are “impermissible compromises of fundamental federalism values” due 
to state regulation in the interjurisdictional gray area. Id. at 517. Whereas in the workers’ 
compensation context, the issue is lack of state regulation to protect workers’ privacy. 
 230. One might argue the issue of privacy protection in workers’ compensation has some 
elements of “uncooperative federalism.” This arises when states utilize the regulatory power 
conferred by the federal government in a cooperative federalism context to “tweak, challenge, 
and even dissent from federal law.” Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009). This may take a few forms, but 
the most applicable to the workers’ compensation context may be “dissent made possible by 
a regulatory gap.” Id. at 1272. According to Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen, this 
dissent may have value by generating innovative solutions or higher standards. Id. at 1276. 
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “sets national air quality standards 
for common pollutants.” Id. States have “discretion [in] implement[ing] these standards as 
long as their plans meet national standards,” but if the states fall short, the EPA retains the 
authority to implement air quality standards. Id. California, which is considered a “super-
regulator” because its vehicle emissions standards surpass federal standards, is exempt from 
certain EPA requirements. Id. at 1277. Other states subsequently adopted California’s 
emissions standards in lieu of federal standards, and the EPA at times has followed 
California’s lead by increasing its own standards. Id. These benefits have not surfaced in the 
workers’ compensation context. States used § 164.512(l) to eliminate the application of the 
HPR without offering other meaningful privacy protections. See supra Part III. Thus, this 
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Most significantly, cooperative federalism emphasizes a voluntary interaction, 
whereby states may gain funding or powers through cooperation with the federal 
government.231 Workers’ compensation presents a different situation, as the federal 
and state governments are dependent under current law to protect privacy, and 
cooperation does not grant states additional funding or powers.  
Abbe Gluck’s work on “interstatutory federalism” captures some of the dynamic 
at stake in symbiotic federalism.232 Gluck, recognizing the limits of cooperative (and 
uncooperative) federalism doctrines in capturing states’ roles in implementing 
federal legislation, proposes a new statutory lens from which to view federal and 
state relationships.233 The states are viewed as purposeful implementers of federal 
statutes.234 Congress drafts statutes in a manner that allows the federal government 
to harness states’ established infrastructure, creativity, and legislative powers to 
attain federal goals.235 State implementation of federal statutes is viewed as an 
expression of federalism in the sense that states’ administrative roles highlight state 
authority, autonomy, and expertise in an area of regulation, despite the umbrella of 
federal law.236 
Gluck’s arguments are helpful for understanding symbiotic federalism and 
workers’ compensation on several fronts. The federalism issue at stake in workers’ 
compensation arises in the context of statutory (regulatory) interpretation rather than 
foundational constitutional conflict. The issue arises because the boundary between 
federal and state powers to protect workers’ privacy under the HPR is unclear. HHS 
has done little to resolve the confusion, leaving the states to stumble in and out of 
privacy protections through the administration of their workers’ compensation 
programs. Further, consistent with Gluck’s view about intentional use of state 
implementers, HHS likely wanted § 164.512(l) to harness states’ on-the-ground 
ability to protect privacy in the manner that best comports with the operation of their 
individual workers’ compensation programs. 
But Gluck’s concept of interstatutory federalism may not, at least in its current 
form, capture all of what is involved with respect to protecting privacy in workers’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
“dissent” has not produced value for privacy protection.    
 231. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
243, 248 (2005). “Dynamic federalism” recognizes an obligate relationship to act to resolve 
jurisdictional conflicts among “overlapping federal and state . . . jurisdictions,” creating a 
model “in which multiple levels of government interact in the regulatory process.” J.B. Ruhl 
& James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
States: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 103–04 (2010) (citation omitted). 
This gives rise to intentional redundancy in regulation, allowing for “governance adaptation 
to transpire more quickly and with less political jockeying than static, exclusive jurisdiction 
models.” Id. at 105; see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism 
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). In the case of workers’ compensation, 
the goal is balancing federal standards for privacy protection and the efficient administration 
of state workers’ compensation programs. A more static model arguably would provide 
stability on both fronts. 
 232. See generally Gluck, supra note 212. 
 233. Id. at 540–42. 
 234. Id. at 537–38. 
 235. Id. at 568–72. 
 236. Id. at 574–76. 
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compensation. Gluck indicates that Congress’s delegation of this administrative 
power to the states to achieve nationalistic goals is both deliberate and purposeful.237 
This contrasts with the addition of § 164.512(l), which was added to the HPR by 
HHS after a notice and comment period, to honor states’ traditional role in 
administrating their own workers’ compensation programs.238 Section 164.512(l) 
was intended to allow states to continue efficiently administering their workers’ 
compensation programs, not to nationalize privacy protection.239 A more analogous 
situation to the dynamic Gluck describes would be a federal workers’ compensation 
statute defining parameters for state workers’ compensation programs (similar to 
Gluck’s example of the states’ ability to implement the insurance exchanges of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)).240 To be sure, this Article argues 
that the HPR sets a floor for privacy protection in terms of the standard for minimum 
PHI disclosure, but the details of that protection are not outlined by the HPR in the 
context of workers’ compensation. State protections could take different forms, and 
they have the potential to be stronger than those of the HPR. 
Further, Gluck’s theory is applied in situations of relatively clear federal and state 
statutory boundaries—as in the state-run health insurance exchanges under the 
ACA—whereas the federal and state roles in privacy protection in workers’ 
compensation are unclear after § 164.512(l). HHS essentially conferred 
administrative power to the states without guidance about the general applicability 
of the HPR to workers’ compensation. The next Section discusses actions that HHS 
must take to clarify the application and role of the HPR in protecting workers’ 
privacy, considering the symbiotic relationship that exists between the federal and 
state governments with regard to protecting such privacy. 
B. Federal Action to Protect Injured Workers’ Medical Privacy  
From a symbiotic federalism perspective, HHS must take several steps to preserve 
privacy in the context of workers’ compensation. These include clarifying aspects of 
the HPR, applying the “minimum necessary” requirement or a similar limitation to 
disclosures made during workers’ compensation proceedings, and restricting ex parte 
communications during such proceedings. Once HHS clarifies its position on 
different parts of the HPR, and after a period for compliance, state workers’ 
compensation laws that continue to fail to protect workers’ privacy must be 
preempted. 
1. Clarifying Requirements and Encouraging State Action  
HHS’s first task is to clarify a couple of aspects of the HPR. First and foremost, 
the purpose behind the exception in § 164.512(l) must be clearly articulated in the 
regulations or a policy statement. As argued in Part II, HHS documents suggest § 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. Id. at 564–76, 582. 
 238. See supra Section II.C. 
 239. See supra Section II.C. 
 240. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 186–
99 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see also Gluck, 
supra note 212, at 570 (discussing state insurance exchanges under the ACA). 
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164.512(l) is intended to facilitate workers’ compensation proceedings and to 
balance the interests of workers and employers, not to serve as a complete waiver of 
workers’ federal privacy protections.241 The agency envisioned a scenario in which 
protecting privacy and facilitating workers’ compensation proceedings are not 
mutually exclusive.242  
Additionally, HHS must clarify the boundaries of § 164.512(l) as applied to 
workers’ compensation proceedings, likely in a policy statement. HHS must address 
how states can both comply with the HPR and administer their workers’ 
compensation programs. To do so, it is necessary for the agency to explain its 
interpretation of the relationship between the federal and state governments with 
respect to protecting privacy in workers’ compensation. The HPR is a floor, and 
states can develop their own protections, but the spirit of the federal rule must be 
honored. At the most basic level, states must narrowly tailor PHI disclosures, limiting 
them to what is actually necessary to administrate claims.  
The next step for HHS will be to provide guidance about scope of PHI disclosure, 
either within a policy statement or another administrative document. Individual states 
currently determine scope of the written record disclosed and whether ex parte 
communications are allowed, and, if so, how they are structured. General statements 
about limiting scope to that which is “relevant,” “pertinent,” or “related” to the injury 
underlying the claim are ineffective in practice. HHS must clarify what is 
“necessary” to administrate claims and may need to provide concrete examples of 
how limits should function in particular situations. This is consistent with the 
HITECH Act, which requires HHS to develop guidance about “minimum necessary” 
disclosures.243 Under this congressional charge, HHS may choose to offer guidance 
about what a minimum necessary disclosure generally means in the context of 
workers’ compensation and who makes that determination.244  
HHS also may decide to reexamine states’ discretion in setting standards for PHI 
disclosure in workers’ compensation as “mandatory” or “permissive.” As discussed 
in Part I, only the latter carries the requirement of “minimum necessary” disclosures 
under the HPR, which seem vital to tailoring disclosures narrowly.245 The “required” 
versus “permitted” distinction results in differences in the scope of disclosures that 
violate the spirit of the HPR.246 The apparent randomness of state selection of 
standards has led not only to inconsistent approaches between states, but also to 
contradictory standards within the same state statutes.247   
Further, HHS may decide to address whether ex parte communications between a 
party and a treating or examining physician during workers’ compensation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. See supra Section II.C. 
 242. See supra Section II.C. 
 243. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13405(b)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 226, 265 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 17935(b)(1)(B) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)) (“Not later than 18 months after [the date 
of enactment of this section], the Secretary shall issue guidance on what constitutes ‘minimum 
necessary’ for purposes of subpart E of part 164 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulation.”). 
 244. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra Section I.B. 
 246. See supra Section I.B. 
 247. See supra Section I.B.3.a. 
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proceedings are allowed under the HPR, and, if they are, whether the PHI disclosed 
must be limited in scope. Notice to the plaintiff or her representative and a protective 
order may be vital to preserving the integrity of diagnoses and other medical 
assessments. Changes with respect to communications may require an amendment to 
the HPR or a policy statement. 
2. Preempting Contrary State Law 
Once HHS clarifies these aspects of the HPR, states must be provided a reasonable 
period for compliance. After that time, state workers’ compensation statutes that 
violate the purpose of the HPR must be preempted. Specifically, HHS must preempt 
state laws that allow overbroad PHI disclosure related to either written medical 
records or ex parte communications, if the agency continues to allow the latter.  
Preemption may be based on the current general preemption provision of the HPR 
or an amended version. Interestingly, HHS did not intend the preemption provision 
of the HPR to be its final statement about preemption. The agency discussed the 
possibility of reexamining preemption if, given more protective state statutes, “dual 
regulation impairs care or the operation of information and payment systems, poses 
risks to confidentiality because of confusion between two levels of law, or creates 
uncertainty among patients about their rights and forms of redress.”248 Clearly, with 
less protective state statutes, the latter two circumstances are present: privacy has 
been compromised in the workers’ compensation system, and uncertainty exists 
about workers’ rights and redress. 
Regardless of whether HHS amends the HPR’s preemption provision, the concept 
of symbiotic federalism sheds light on the basis for the preemption of state statutes 
supporting overbroad PHI disclosures, including some ex parte communications. 
States must administrate their workers’ compensation programs in accordance with 
the HPR. If the federal government provides adequate guidance about how to comply 
with the HPR in light of § 164.512(l), states must develop their own programs to fill 
in gaps in privacy protection.249 If states fail to do so, the HPR creates the floor for 
privacy protection, and conflicting state workers’ compensation laws must be 
preempted.250 Overbroad PHI disclosures, whether through written records or ex 
parte communications, violate the spirit of the HPR to tailor such disclosures 
narrowly.251  
Comparative situations arise in environmental law, which might serve as useful 
guides. The prevailing regulatory approach in environmental law is a cooperative, 
conditional- or partial-preemption regulatory strategy, whereby Congress requires a 
federal oversight agency (typically the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) to 
set national standards and to delegate implementation responsibilities to states with 
approved programs.252 Unlike total preemption, which requires state performance 
according to federal prescription, this cooperative arrangement gives states flexibility 
in program design. States have freedom in implementation and enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 
 248. Hearing, supra note 94. 
 249. See supra Section II.D. 
 250. See supra Section II.A. 
 251. See supra Section II.A. 
 252. See infra notes 253–55. 
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strategies, so long as their laws and regulations are at least as protective as the 
applicable federal statute. If a state chooses not to implement its own regulatory 
program, the federal government remains the regulatory agent. Similarly, if an 
approved state program inadequately enforces national standards, the federal 
government reserves the right to preempt state authority and to regulate on the state’s 
behalf. This approach is taken with respect to the Clean Water Act,253 the Clean Air 
Act,254 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.255  
                                                                                                                 
 
 253. The Clean Water Act (CWA) is designed to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Clean Water Act, 33  
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). The CWA includes a mandate compelling states to establish, for each 
of their most polluted waterways, a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)—a measurement 
intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into those bodies of water. Id. § 1313(d)(1); 
Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999). If 
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See Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The EPA’s inaction 
appears to be tantamount to approval of state decisions that TMDL’s are unneeded. State 
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the goals of federal anti-pollution policy.”); Kingman Park, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 2 (holding that 
the CWA should be liberally construed to achieve its objectives and to impose a duty on the 
EPA to establish TMDLs when a state defaults or refuses to act over a long period, in this case 
18 years); Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 921 (E.D. 
Va. 1998) (“[T]he most compelling reason to follow Scott . . . is that the EPA’s alternative 
interpretation of the statute would allow for recalcitrant states to short-circuit the Clean Water 
Act and render it a dead letter.” (citation omitted)); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 762 F. 
Supp. 1422, 1427 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (finding that “Congress intended that EPA’s affirmative 
duties be triggered upon a state’s failure to submit a list, or any TMDL at all”).   
 254. Congress initially enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1963 to “protect and enhance 
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). The CAA was amended 
in 1977, in response to deteriorating visibility in wilderness areas, national parks, and other 
places. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 815 F.3d 519, 524 (9th 
Cir. 2016). To improve outdoor visibility, the CAA “invite[d] each State to submit to [the] 
EPA a ‘State Implementation Plan’ (‘SIP’) setting forth emission limits and other measures 
necessary to make reasonable progress toward the national visibility goal.” Id. (quoting Nat’l 
Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 788 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), 7491(b)(2) (2012))). If a state chooses not to submit a SIP, or if 
the EPA disapproves a SIP in whole or in part, the CAA requires the EPA to produce a Federal 
Implementation Plan (FIP) for that State. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). The EPA also may issue a 
FIP for a state with a plan that does not satisfy the minimum criteria of the CAA. Id. This 
applies to partial plans as well. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
686 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the EPA has a “duty to take further action 
upon partial disapproval” of California’s SIP and to issue a FIP).   
 255. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) enables states to 
implement their own regulatory programs or to opt for direct federal regulation. 30  
U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). “If a State does not . . . submit a proposed permanent program that 
complies with the Act . . . the full regulatory burden [is] borne by the Federal Government.” 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). Violations 
unaddressed by the states also fall to the federal government. See, e.g., Annaco, Inc. v. Hodel, 
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While the workers’ compensation situation differs because states are not operating 
programs under federal oversight with the purpose of supporting a distinctive federal 
goal, the cooperative nature is similar. States are operating programs that must 
comport with federal privacy law to support the mutual state and federal goal of 
protecting workers’ privacy, and such cooperation avoids the federal government 
stepping in. Thus, the environmental law experience may prove instructive for HHS 
when addressing privacy concerns in workers’ compensation. 
C. Other State Actions to Protect Injured Workers’ Medical Privacy 
In addition to following HHS guidance to tailor PHI disclosures narrowly, states 
may take additional measures to protect the medical privacy of injured workers. First 
and foremost, states allowing ex parte communications in workers’ compensation 
proceedings (if they are not prohibited by HHS) could require a notice to the injured 
worker, her counsel, or other representative. This would guard against unauthorized 
disclosures of PHI as well as help preserve the integrity of the medical opinions at 
stake. Currently, notice of ex parte communications is required in only twelve of the 
thirty-three states explicitly allowing ex parte communications.256 
Additionally, states may require protective orders to control the scope of PHI 
disclosures in ex parte communications. Such protective orders currently are required 
in California for mental health records, with twenty-six states addressing but not 
requiring them.257 California requires that: 
[w]henever . . . a mental health record is filed by a party at the Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Board, the party filing such a record shall request 
and obtain a protective order from a Workers’ Compensation 
Administrative Law Judge that shall specify in what manner the mental 
health record may be inspected, copied and entered into evidence.258  
Other states adopt related protections that fall short of requiring protective orders. 
Alaska requires that “[i]f after a prehearing the board or its designee determines that 
information sought from the employee is not relevant to the injury that is the subject 
of the claim, a protective order will be issued.”259 In Ohio, two courts held that 
medical records must be examined in camera to determine whether they are “causally 
or historically” related to the action.260 
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Reclamation and Enforcement has authority to act “if, after ten days, the state has not taken 
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 256. See supra Section III.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
Injured workers are undeniably placed in a different position with the state than 
other citizens when they must sacrifice medical privacy to obtain compensation for 
their injuries. This is especially troubling in a country where medical privacy is a 
federal right. Symbiotic federalism helps identify why injured workers are in this 
position and how it may be changed. Symbiotic federalism explains the unclear 
boundary between states’ historic roles in protecting privacy and administering their 
own workers’ compensation programs and the federal government’s Commerce 
Clause power to protect workers’ privacy. The relationship is one of mutual 
dependency, as both levels of government are needed under current law to protect 
medical privacy in workers’ compensation. The HPR forms the floor for privacy 
protection, and the states arguably know best the privacy protections required in the 
daily administration of their own workers’ compensation programs. 
In a move toward cooperation with the states, HHS included § 164.512(l) in the 
HPR. This section exempts workers’ compensation from the HPR insofar as it is 
necessary to lift privacy protections to administrate workers’ compensation programs 
efficiently. In return, HHS envisioned a scenario whereby states would fill in any 
gaps in privacy protection with their own laws. Unfortunately, states have not done 
so, and § 164.512(l) is widely misinterpreted by courts as a wholesale waiver of the 
federal privacy rights of injured workers. Workers, many with severe disabilities, are 
placed in the position of forgoing compensation or sacrificing their medical privacy.  
When such failures occur, HHS must remedy the situation. HHS must clarify the 
meaning of § 164.512(l) and issue clear guidance about how states can narrowly 
tailor PHI disclosures to comply with the HPR. HHS may choose to issue guidance 
on the legality of, and possible conditions for, ex parte communications in workers’ 
compensation proceedings; whether PHI disclosures should be considered 
“permissive” instead of “mandatory” and thereby subject to the “minimum 
necessary” disclosure standard of the HPR; and what “minimum necessary” 
disclosures mean in the context of workers’ compensation and who determines them. 
If after such steps and a period for compliance states continue to fail to protect injured 
workers’ privacy, federal protections control, and conflicting state workers’ 
compensation statutes must be preempted.  
Under this vision of governmental cooperation to protect workers’ medical 
privacy, the outcome in Laura McRae’s case would have been very different. The ex 
parte communication either would have not taken place or would have taken place 
with some key restrictions. If ex parte communications during workers’ 
compensation proceedings are prohibited by HHS, sanctions likely would be issued 
by the agency (recall that Georgia’s workers’ compensation statute is silent on the 
issue of ex parte communications). If such communications are allowed but 
restricted, notice and a protective order to limit the PHI disclosed may be required. 
Further, the PHI generated would be narrowly tailored and may be subject to the 
“minimum necessary” disclosure standard of the HPR, rather than defined by defense 
counsel or other parties to the case. As a result, the PHI disclosed about McRae truly 
would be “related” to and “necessary” for the administration of her claim, and 
McRae’s physician would not be pressured to engage in activities she views as 
inconsistent with the ethical practice of medicine. This vision comes closer to the 
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goals of both the founders of workers’ compensation and HHS for privacy protection, 
in terms of balancing employer and employee interests post-industrialization. 
